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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Agency-Assault by Employee of Public Utility
The liability of the master for the torts of his servant is usually
based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. No recovery is allowed
on this ground unless the servant was acting within the scope of his
employment,' even though at the time the act complained of was com-
mitted, he was in the master's general employment and pay.2
In Hoppe v. Deese and Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Com-
pany,3 the trial court sustained the company's demurrer to a complaint
which alleged that an employee of the company was sent into plaintiff's
home on a business mission; that while there he willfully and maliciously
committed an assault and battery upon the plaintiff by placing her upon
a bed; and that this was done with licentious intent and purpose. On
appeal, the ruling on the demurrer was held to be correct as it appeared
on the face of the complaint that the wrongful act of the employee was
outside the scope of his employment.4
This decision is sound if the liability of the telephone company is to
be based solely upon respondeat superior. However, since the defendant
is a public utility,- liability might have been predicated on another
ground. A public utility is clearly distinguishable from a private busi-
ness. 6 For instance, it enjoys special franchise rights which subjects it
to a greater degree of control and regulation than ordinary businesses
are subjected to, but which gives it a field relatively free from com-
petition.7 It has the right in carrying out its duties to take property
through eminent domain proceedings upon paying a reasonable com-
'-Parrish v. Boysell Mfg. Co., 211 N. C. 7, 188 S. E. 818 (1937) (evidence
showed assault on plaintiff outside scope of employment) ; Linville v. Nissen, 162
N. C. 95, 77 S. E. 1096 (1913) (chauffeur took personal pleasure trip with family
car, employer not liable) ; Bucken v. South and Western R.R., 157 N. C. 443, 73
S. E. 137 (1911) (assault by servant for own purpose and in pursuit of own
personal desires, master not liable).
'Wyllie v. Palmer, 137 N. Y. 248, 33 N. E. 381 (1893) (employee of seller
acting under control of buyer injured plaintiff; held: buyer, not seller, liable).
'232 N. C. 698, 61 S. E. 2d 903 (1950).
' Hill v. Western Union Tel. Co., 67 Fed. 487 (5th Cir. 1933) (similar hold-
ing). N. C. GEN. STAT. §62-93 (1943), which provides that the willful act of
any agent of a utility, acting within the scope of his employment, shall be deemed
to be the willful act of the utility, has never been referred to by the North
Carolina court.
'State v. Holm, 138 Minn. 281, 164 N. W. 989 (1917) ; Hildebrand v. Southern
Bell Tel. Co., 219 N. C. 402, 14 S. E. 2d 252 (1941); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Lamb, 140 Tenn. 107, 203 S. W. 752 (1918).
'Dunn v. Western Union Tel. Co., 2 Ga. App. 845, 59 S. E. 189 (1907).
" New Decatur v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 176 Ala. 492, 58 So. 613 (1912);
State ex rel. Shaver v. Iowa Tel. Co., 175 Iowa 607, 154 N. W. 678 (1915).
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pensation to the owner.8 As a result of these differences, a public
utility owes a greater obligation to the public than do private busi-
nesses.0 Included in this obligation is the duty to render its services
impartially and indiscriminately to members of the public.10 The right
to enjoy utility services without being subjected to assaults or abuses
is a corollary of this duty to serve all comers.1 This peculiar nature
of the business of a public utility, with its privileges and obligations,
together with the right of the public to demand its services, creates a
special relationship between the two.12  This relationship is not based
on contractual or quasi-contractual rights between the parties.
It is well established that certain utilities are liable for assaults com-
mitted upon customers by employees and by strangers. For example,
railroads owe an absolute duty to protect passengers from assaults by
employees, 13 and owe a duty to exercise a high degree of care to pre-
vent assaults by co-passengers 14 and by strangers."; A railroad has
been held liable for an assault committed upon a plaintiff while he was
in the railroad station checking out freight.16 The court in that case
' Richmond v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 174 U. S. 761 (1899); Louis-
ville Company v. Western Union Tel. Co., 195 Ala. 124, 71 So. 118 (1915) ; Union
Pacific R.R. v. Colorado Postal Tel. Co., 30 Colo. 133, 69 Pac. 564 (1902) ; State
ex rel. National Subway Co. v. St. Louis, 145 Mo. 551, 46 S. W. 981 (1898) ;
Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 23 Utah 474, 65 Pac. 735
(1901).
' Buder v. First National Bank, 16 F. 2d 990 (8th Cir. 1927) (public utility
charged with duty to supply public with use of all property and facilities owned
or furnished by them); Richardson v. Railroad Commission of California, 191
Cal. 716, 218 Pac. 418 (1923); State v. Holm, 138 Minn. 281, 164 N. W. 989
(1917) (telephone company is public utility owing special duty to public); Hilde-
brand v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 219 N. C. 402, 14 S. E. 2d 252 (1914) (tele-
phone company as a public service company owes special duty to public) ; Southern
Ohio Power Co. v. Pacific Utilities Commission of Ohio, 110 Ohio St. 246, 143
N. E. 700 (1924) (Public utilities are devoted to the public use.).
"0 State ex rel. Goodwine v. Cadwallader, 172 Ind. 619, 87 N. E. 644 (1909)
(Telephone exchanges are impressed with a public use and must furnish impartial
service without discrimination to all persons in the same or a similar class.);
Clay County Co-op Tel. Co. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 107 Kan. 169, 109 Pac.
747 (1920) (Telephone companies are obligated to serve without discrimination
all applicants for services within the field they occupy.).
"'Dunn v. Western Union Tel. Co., 2 Ga. App. 845, 59 S. E. 189 (1907)
(Public utilities should provide safe access to the place opened for the transaction
of business in question.); Buchanan v. Western Union Tel. Co., 115 S. C. 433,
106 S. E. 159 (1920).
2 Chesapeake and Ohio Tel. Co. v. Baltimore and Ohio Tel. Co., 66 Md. 339,
7 At. 809 (1887).
1 Bledso v. West, 186 Mo. App. 460, 171 S. W. 622 (1914) ; William v. Gill,
122 N. C. 967, 29 S. E. 879 (1898) ; Jones v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 108 S. C.
217, 94 S. E. 49 (1917); Neville v. Southern Ry., 126 Tenn. 96, 146 S. W. 846
(1912) ; Whitlock v. Northern Pacific Ry., 59 Wash. 15, 109 Pac. 188 (1910).
1 Hines v. Miniard, 208 Ala. 174, 94 So. 302 (1922) ; New Orleans, St. L. and
C. R.R. v. Burke, 53 Miss. 200 (1876).
1" Southern Ry. v. Haynes, 186 Ala. 60, 65 So. 339 (1914) ; Seawell v. Caro-
lina Central R.R., 132 N. C. 856, 44 S. E. 620 (1903).
1" Georgia R.R. v. Richmond, 98 Ga. 495, 25 S. E. 565 (1896).
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called attention to the fact that the relationship of carrier and passenger
did not exist. A pullman company has been held responsible for an
indecent assault made upon a female passenger by a porter of the com-
pany.1 7 A like result was reached where the porter was not even em-
ployed by the company at the time.18  A cab company has been held
liable for an assault committed upon a passenger by its driver ;19 also
when the assault was committed by a person having no connection with
the company.20 A telegraph company has been held liable for an inde-
cent proposal made by a messenger boy to the recipient of a telegram.21
A bus company has been held liable for an assault committed upon a
passenger by a stranger.22 A city-owned public utility was held liable
for an assault committed by its superintendent on a customer while he
was trying to pay his gas bill.2 3 Hotels and inns, even though they are
not public utilities, have been held liable for assaults committed upon
guests by their employees 24 and by strangers.2 5 Since some public util-
ities, and other companies owing a special duty to serve, are held liable
for torts committed upon patrons by employees acting without the scope
of their employment and even by strangers, it is obvious that the basis
for liability in this type of case is not confined to respondeat superior.
The basis for liability includes the breach of the special duty owed to
the injured party.
There are other reasons for holding the utility liable in a situation
such as that presented in the instant case. Members of the public
should not be discouraged from cooperating with public utilities in their
rendering of services. For example, owners should allow utility em-
ployees to have free access to utility installations on their property.
Furthermore, members of the public should not be handicapped in ob-
taining the services rendered by public utilities by having to take the
risk of being subjected to physical injury or abusive language. The
"Campbell v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 42 Fed. 484 (C. C. N. D. Iowa
1890).
" Dwinelle v. New York Central & H. R.R., 120 N. Y. 117, 24 N. E. 319
(1890).
" Korner v. Cosgrove, 108 Ohio 484, 141 N. E. 267 (1923).
"
0 Yellow Cab Company of Atlanta v. Carmichal, 33 Ga. App. 364, 126 S. E.
269 (1925).Buchanan v. Western Union Tel. Co., 115 S. C. 433, 106 S. E. 159 (1920).
"Wilson v. Pan-American Bus Lines, Inc., 217 N. C. 586, 9 S. E. 2d 1
(1940); Southern Plains Coaches, Inc. v. Box, 111 S. W. 2d 1151 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1937).
Munick v. City of Durham, 181 N. C. 188, 106 S. E. 665 (1921).2 4Duckworth v. Appostalis, 208 Fed. 936 (E. D. Tenn. 1913); Clancy v.
Barker, 71 Neb. 83, 98 N. W. 440 (1904); Rommel v. Schambacker, 120 Pa.
579, 11 At. 779 (1887).
. Curran v. Olson, 88 Minn. 307, 92 N. W. 1124 (1903); Molloy v. Coletti,
114 Misc. 177, 186 N. Y. Supp. 730 (1921); Furren v. Casperson, 147 Wash.
257, 265 Pac. 472 (1928).
1951]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
employee's presence in the plaintiff's home in the instant case was in the
exercise of a privilege necessarily extended to him as an employee of a
telephone company. The employee's action was clearly an abuse of this
privilege.
It would seem, therefore, that the defendant company should be
liable since the commission of the tort constituted a breach of a special
duty owed to the plaintiff by the company. If this reasoning is fol-
lowed members of the public will be given protection from such inci-
dents when taking advantage of the conveniences which public utilities
were created to provide and in which its patrons have a right to share.
ROLAND C. BRASWELL.
Conflict of Laws-Divorce-Collateral Attack Barred by Laches
The jurisdiction of a state to grant a divorce is based upon the
domicile of one or both of the parties within the state at the commence-
ment of the action. Accordingly, a divorce decree rendered by a court
without such jurisdiction is not entitled to full faith and credit in other
states.' The finding of domicile by the divorce court is not conclusive
and is subject to collateral attack in other states by a party not person-
ally before the court when the decree was granted. 2
In a recent case3 H obtained a Nevada divorce decree from W-l,
a resident of the District of Columbia, who did not appear in the divorce
action. H, subsequent to the decree, married W-2. In a proceeding
before the Federal District Court in Florida, W-1 contended that the
decree was void as H was never domiciled in Nevada. The court held
that W-1, knowing of the divorce decree and delaying, without excuse,
for nearly twenty years, was now guilty of laches and estopped from
attacking its validity.
In theory the Nevada divorce decree was void and could not be
vitalized by delay or non-action of the deserted spouse. Some cases
have so held.4 Others have held that laches will attach by reason of
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 326, 229 (1944); Crouch v. Crouch,
28 Cal. 2d 243, 169 P. 2d 897, 900 (1946) ; Coe v. Coe, 136 Mass. 423, 55 N. E.
2d 702 (1944). For a complete list of cases see Note, 157 A. L. R. 1399 supple-
menting annotation in 143 A. L. R. 1294; GOODRICH, CONFLICTS OF LAWS §127
(3d ed. 1949).
2Rice v. Rice, 336 U. S. 674 (1949); RESTATEMENT. CONFLcrs OF LAWS §111,
comment a (1934).
8 Carpenter v. Carpenter, 93 F. Supp. 225 (S. D. Fla. 1950) (The court also
found that the evidence offered by W-I was insufficient to rebut the presumption
of H's domicile in Nevada.).
"McNutt v. McNutt, 366 Cal. App. 652, 98 P. 2d 253 (1940) ; Mills v. Mills,
119 Conn. 612, 179 Atl. 5 (1935); Field v. Field, 215 Ill. 496, 74 N. E. 443
(1905); Sammons v. Pike, 108 Minn. 291, 122 N. W. 168 (1903); Lawler v.
Lawler, 2 N. J. 527, 66 A. 2d 855 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Baumann v. Baumann, 250
N. Y. 382, 165 N. E. 819 (1929); Melnick v. Melnick, 147 Pa. Super. 564, 25
A. 2d 111 (1942); Richmond v. Sangster, 217 S. W. 723 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
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delay that works disavantage or injury to another.5 Under this latter
view, the application of laches must depend upon the circumstances of
each case.
In determining if laches should be applied, courts have considered
numerous factors. Whether the defendant had knowledge the divorce
was void has been given weight by some courts.6 Lapse of time caus-
ing prejudice due to the loss of material evidence by death of parties
or witnesses has also been thought to be of significance. 7 It has been
held that remarriage of the divorce plaintiff has no effect on the appli-
cation of laches.8 Yet, other cases have held that upon remarriage of
the divorce plaintiff the rights of innocent third parties have intervened
and may render it inequitable for the defendant to attack the validity of
the divorce." But, where the second spouse of the divorce plaintiff
encouraged the divorce or knew of the circumstances under which it
was obtained, the second marriage of the plaintiff has not been given
consideration in determining the applicability of laches.' ° Affirmative
acts of the defendant such as asserting the validity of the decree' or
remarriage 12 will constitute acquiescence and bar collateral attack. How-
ever, delay in attacking the foreign decree may be justified on the ground
that it was impossible to obtain personal service of process on the plain-
tiff within the state of the original domicile. 13
Assuming that a non-appearing defendant in a foreign divorce action
may be barred by laches due to an unreasonable delay in contesting the
Bliss v. Bliss, 50 F. 2d 1002 (D. C. Cir. 1931); McNeil v. McNeil, 170 Fed.
289 (9th Cir. 1909); Pawley v. Pawley. 46 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1950); Reed v.
Reed, 52 Mich. 117, 17 N. W. 720 (1883); Sleeper v. Sleeper, 129 N. J. Eq. 94,
18 A. 2d 1 (Ct. Err. & App. 1941) ; Cope v. Cope, 123 N. J. Eq. 190, 196 Ati. 422
(Ct. Err. & App. 1938); Robinson v. Robinson, 94 N. Y. S. 2d 806 (Sup. Ct.
1946) ; Finan v. Finan, 47 N. Y. S. 2d 429 (Sup. Ct. 1944) ; McNeir v. McNeir,
178 Va. 285, 16 S. E. 2d 632 (1941); Dry v. Rice, 147 Va. 331, 137 S. E. 473
(1927); Wright Lumber Co. v. McCord, 145 Wis. 93, 128 N. W. 873 (1910);
see Note, 34 MINN. L. Ray. 514 (1950).
' Field v. Field, 215 Ill. 496, 74 N. E. 443 (1905); Wright Lumber Co. v.
McCord, 145 Wis. 93, 128 N. W. 873 (1910).
' Reed v. Reed, 52 Mich. 117, 17 N. W. 720 (1883); Dry v. Rice, 147 Va.
331, 137 S. E. 473 (1927).
8 Bethune v. Bethune, 192 Ark. 811, 94 S. W. 2d 1043 (1936); Mills v. Mills,
119 Conn. 612, 179 At!. 5 (1935); Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y. 382, 165
N. E. 819 (1929); Sitterly v. Sitterly, 186 Misc. 31, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 424 (Sup.
Ct. 1945); Melnick v. Melnick, 147 Pa. Super. 564, 25 A. 2d 111 (1942); Rich-
mond v. Sangster, 217 S. W. 723 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
'McNeil v. McNeil, 170 Fed. 289 (9th Cir. 1909); Sammons v. Pike, 108
Minn. 291, 122 N. W. 168 (1903); Sleeper v. Sleeper, 129 N. J. Eq. 94, 18 A.
2d 1 (Ct. Err. & App. 1941) ; Cope v. Cope, 123 N. J. Eq. 190, 196 Atl. 422 (Err.
& App. 1938); McNeir v. McNeir, 178 Va. 285, 16 S. E. 2d 632 (1941); Dry v.
Rice, 147 Va. 331, 137 S. E. 473 (1927).
"0 Lawler v. Lawler, 2 N. 3. 527, 66 A. 2d 855 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Pomerance
v. Pomerance, 187 Misc. 20, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 227 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
" Marcus v. Marcus, 194 Misc. 464, 90 N. Y. S. 2d 830 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
2 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICTS oF LAWS §112 (1934).
"1 Melnick v. Melnick, 147 Pa. Super. 564, 25 A. 2d 111 (1942).
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validity of the divorce decree, what remedies are available to the de-
fendant if sought within a reasonable time?
A court of equity may enjoin the prosecution of an action in another
state by a citizen of its own state. Such an injunction is not a violation
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause or the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Federal Constitution; nor does it violate the comity rela-
tions that exist between the several states.14  In such cases the decree
of the court is based on personal jurisdiction and directed to the party
and not the tribunal where the suit or proceeding is pending. Where
both parties are domiciled in the same state, the deserted party may
obtain an injunction, restraining his spouse from further prosecuting
divorce proceedings commenced by him in a court of another state.15
Injunction would seem proper in such a case to prevent evasion of the
laws of the domicile, great expense and hardship in defending in an-
other state, uncertainty of the marital status, and embarrassment of the
deserted party. If the foreign divorce has not been commenced but
merely threatened, there is conflicting authority whether an injunction
will issue.16 In any event injunction will only lie where the deserting
spouse has not established a bona fide domicile in the state in which
the divorce is sought.17
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution does
not prevent a collateral attack in one state on a divorce decree rendered
in another state upon the ground that neither party was domiciled at
the divorce forum.' 8  Such an attack may arise out of a separate action
for divorce brought by the non-appearing defendant.19 Should the de-
serted spouse be the wife, the validity of the decree may be questioned
1 28 Am.' Jtu 389, IIqJuNcrIoN §204; Jacobs, The Utility of Injunctions and
Declaratory Judgments it Migratory Divorce, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 370, 374(1935).
"Usen v. Usen, 136 Me. 480, 13 A. 2d 738 (1940); Ippolito v. Ippolito, 3
N. J. 561, 71 A. 2d 196 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Ward v. Ward, 6 N. J. Super. 130, 70
A. 2d 502 (1950) ; Gross v. Gross, 13 N. J. Misc. 449, 180 AtI. 204 (Ch. 1935) ;
Knapp v. Knapp, 12 N. J. Misc. 599, 173 Ati. 343 (Ch. 1934); Barzilay v. Bar-
zilay, 75 N. Y. S. 2d 428 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ; Pereira v. Pereira, 272 App. Div. 281,
70 N. Y. S. 2d 763 (1st Dep't 1947) ; Borda v. Borda, 44 R. 1. 337, 117 AtI. 362(1922). But cf. Gaskell v. Gaskell, 189 Misc. 504, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 440 (Sup. Ct.
1947) (injunction against the prosecution of a divorce action in a foreign country
was denied).
" Kahn v. Kahn, 325 Ill. App. 137, 59 N. E. 2d 874 (1945) (injunction issued
restraining the commencement of a foreign divorce) ; Carr v. Carr, 52 N. Y. S.
2d 386 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (injunction denied) ; accord, DeRaay v. DeRaay, 255 App.
Div. 544, 8 N. Y. S. 2d 361 (1st Dep't 1938), aff'd, 280 N. Y. 822, 21 N. E. 2d
879 (1939).
" Smith v. Smith, 364 Pa. 81, 70 A. 2d 630 (1950).
" Rice v. Rice, 336 U. S. 674 (1949) ; BEALE, TEE CONFLICTS OF LAWS §111.2(1935).
9 Crouch v. Crouch, 28 Cal. 2d 243, 169 P. 2d 897 (1946) ; Bobala v. Bobala,
68 Ohio App. 63, 33 N. E. 2d 845 (1940) ; Sitterly v. Sitterly, 186 Misc. 31, 58
N. Y. S. 2d 424 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
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in an action for support.20  In both actions, if the foreign decree is
pleaded as a defense, the court may inquire into the jurisdiction of the
foreign court.2
1
The deserted spouse may also resort to the declaratory judgment,
requesting the court to determine the marital status of the parties. If
it is successfully proved that the plaintiff in the divorce action was not
domiciled at the divorce forum the court will adjudge the foreign divorce
decree null and void.22  That a declaratory judgment is an appropriate
remedy seems well settled today2 3  In such a case there is an actual
controversy as one spouse asserts that the foreign divorce is valid and
the other contends that it is not.2 4 Both have an interest in the marital
status; and if the deserted spouse does not wish a divorce or support,
there is no adequate remedy at law.25 Thus, the action will settle the
status and terminate the controversy.
2 6
These remedies seem to afford the non-appearing defendant in a
foreign divorce suit adequate protection of his or her marital status
and property rights. Reasonably prompt action would prevent the re-
sult of the principal case.
ROBERT M. WILEY.
Federal Courts-Civil Rights Act-Stay of State
Criminal Proceedings
In 1793, Congress, apprehending the danger of encroachment by fed-
eral courts upon the jurisdiction of state courts, passed a statute pro-
hibiting the enjoining of proceedings in state courts by courts of the
United States.' This statute, with but one amendment, 2 remained
" White v. White, 150 F. 2d 157 (D. C. Cir. 1945) ; Evans v. Evans, 149 F.
2d 831 (D. C. Cir. 1945) ; Atkins v. Atkins, 386 Ill. 345, 54 N. E. 2d 488 (1945);
Phelps v. Phelps, 154 Pa. Super. 270, 35 A. 2d 530 (1944).2 Note, 157 A. L. R. 1399 (1945).
" Mills v. Mills, 119 Conn. 612, 179 AtI. 5 (1935) ; Hogan v. Hogan, 320 Mass.
658, 70 N. E. 2d 821 (1947) ; Lawler v. Lawler, 2 N. J. 527, 66 A. 2d 855 (Sup.
Ct. 1949) ; Henry v. Henry, 140 N. J. Eq. 21, 144 Atl. 18 (Ch. 1928) ; Lowe v.
Lowe, 265 N. Y. 197, 192 N. E. 291 (1934); Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y.
382, 165 N. E. 819 (1929); Altholy v. Altholy, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 143 (Sup. Ct.
1947); Smerda v. Smerda, 74 N. E. 2d 751 (Ohio 1947); Melnick v. Melnick,
147 Pa. Super. 564, 25 A. 2d 111 (1942); BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
478 (2d ed. 1941) ; see Jacobs, The Utility of Injunctions and Declaratory Judg-
inents in Migratory Divorce, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 370, 391 (1935).
BORcHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 479 (2d ed. 1941).
24 Melnick v. Melnick, 147 Pa. Super. 564, 25 A. 2d 111 (1942).
"Henry v. Henry, 140 N. J. Eq. 21, 144 Atl. 18 (Ch. 1928) ; Melnick v. Mel-
nick, 147 Pa. Super. 564, 25 A. 2d 111 (1942).
" Hogan v. Hogan, 320 Mass. 658, 70 N. E. 2d 821 (1947).
S,. . .nor shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any
court of a state." Act of March 2, 1793, c. 22, §5, 1 STAT. 334 (1793), as
amended, REv. STAT. §720 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §379 (1926), 62 STAT. 968, 28
U. S. C. §2283 (1948). This statute has been held not to be jurisdictional, but
1951]
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basically unchanged until 1948. In the intervening period, however,
many judicial exceptions were made as to its applicability.8 In 1941,
the case of Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co.4 disapproved several of
these court made exceptions and expressly overruled one of them.5
Also, Congress has enacted exceptions to the "anti-injunction" statute,
by other acts which expressly provide in specific instances, for stay of
state court proceedings. 6 These Congressional exceptions were recog-
nized and approved in the Toucey case.
As a result of the Toucey case, Congress amended the "anti-
injunction" statute when the new Judicial Code was enacted in 1948.
The new Act reads:
"A court of the United States may not grant an injunction
to stay proceedings in a state court except (1) as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or (2) where necessary in aid
of its jurisdiction, or (3) to protect or effectuate its judgments." 7
The first exception is merely Congressional recognition of the long
standing, unquestioned, legislative exceptions and had no real effect on
the existing law; but the latter two exceptions were inserted to reinstate
the judicial exceptions questioned or overruled by the Toucey case.,
In the recent case of Cooper v. Hutchinson,9 a novel question deal-
ing with the application of the "anti-injunction" statute was presented.
Cooper was tried and convicted of murder by a county court in New
Jersey, being represented at trial by court appointed counsel. Between
merely as going to the question of whether there is equity in a particular bill.
Smith v. Apple, 264 U. S. 274, 279 (1924).21,. . . except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law
relating to proceedings in bankruptcy." REv. STAT. §720 (1875).
'The authorities are not all in accord as to the classification of these ex-
ceptions, but generally they are: (1) The res cases, where the jurisdiction of a
federal court has attached to the subject matter of a particular action, an in-
junction will lie to prevent any other court from taking jurisdiction over the
same subject matter. (2) The ancillary cases, where the injunction would be
granted as ancillary to other relief being sought. (3) The cases in which fed-
eral courts have enjoined the enforcement of void or fraudulent judgments obtained
in a state court. (4) The refitigation cases, where injunctions are granted against
state court actions which seek to relitigate the same issue decided in the federal
court. See generally Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U. S. 118 (1941) ;
Barrett, Federal linjuction Against Proceedings in State Courts, 35 CALIF. L.
REv. 545 (1947).
"314 U. S. 118 (1941). Notes, 27 CORNELL L. Q. 270 (1942), 27 IowA L. REV.
652 (1942), 26 MINN. L. REv. 558 (1942).
'The relitigation cases were overruled and doubt was cast on all other ex-
ceptions to the "anti-injunction" statute except the res cases.
' See notes 19, 20, and 21 infra; MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE U. S. JUDICIAL
CODE 10.03 (49) p. 396 (1949).
62 STAT. 968, 28 U. S. C. §2283 (1948) (numbers supplied).
'See 28 U. S. C. A. §2283, Reviser's notes (1948) ; Mangan, Federal Legis-
lation, The Judicial Code of 1948, 37 GEo. LAW J. 394, 396 (1949) ; MOORE, COM-
MENTARY ON TEE U. S. JUDICIAL CODE 10.03(49) p. 410 (1949).
' 184 F. 2d 119 (3rd Cir. 1950).
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trial and appeal he secured the services of two New Jersey attorneys
and three New York attorneys. The latter were admitted pro hac vice
in the Supreme Court of New Jersey and later in the county court.
Upon reversal of the conviction, the attorneys proceeded in the county
court with various preliminary matters incident to the new trial. Be-
fore the new trial commenced, the trial judge, without a hearing, entered
an order depriving the New York attorneys of further authority to
appear in the case. There was no charge of misconduct. Cooper, the
accused, then filed this action in the federal district court seeking to
enjoin the trial judge from proceeding further with the case until the
New York attorneys were recognized. The accused charged that he
had been deprived of rights guaranteed by the fifth,10 sixth,11 and four-
teenth'12 amendments of the Constitution, and that such was a violation
of the Civil Rights Act.' 3  Upon dismissal of the complaint, 14 appeal
was taken to the Court of Appeals.
The court refused to pass upon the constitutional questions raised,
deferring them until the New Jersey Supreme Court had an oppor-
tunity to act. However, the court did pass upon the problem raised by
the plaintiff as to the Civil Rights Act and held the Act to be an express
exception to the "anti-injunction" statute, thus implying that injunction
would be proper if the court found it necessary.
Assuming the action of the trial judge violated the aforementioned
constitutional rights, which would necessarily violate the Civil Rights
Act, the case raises two interesting questions.
(1) Does the Civil Rights Act authorize stay of state court proceed-
ings in case of violation of its provisions?
The decision in the instant case cites no authority in support of its
position on this point, and a diligent search indicates that this is the
only federal appellate court which has so held. In several cases decided
in the old circuit courts, this issue was raised and in each case the court
held the Civil Rights Act did iwt in any way modify the "anti-injunction"
10 U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. V, "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law. .. "
11 U. S. CoxsT. AMEND. VI, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
1' U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV §1, ". . . No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. .. ."
1" "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." REv. STAT.
§1979 (1875), 8 U. S. C. §43 (1942).
14 Cooper v. Hutchinson, 88 F. Supp. 774 (D. N. J. 1950).
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statute.15  Further, in the Toucey case, Justice Frankfurter listed the
statutes which were express authorizations for stay of state court pro-
ceedings, and no mention was made of the Civil Rights Act.' 0
The Act was passed to provide a method of enforcing the provisions
of the Constitution, mainly the rights guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment.1 7  It would seem that if the Act had been considered an
express exception to the "anti-injunction" statute, it would have been
raised in those cases where the court refused to enjoin unconstitutional
proceedings in a state court because of the "anti-injunction" statute.
It has never been so used.18
The Civil Rights Act provides that a violator "... shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress." Comparing this with the terms of the other
acts declared to be express exceptions to the "anti-injunction" statute,
it becomes obvious that no such construction was intended of the Civil
Rights Act. For instance, the original Interpleader Act provided that
"notwithstanding any provisions of the Judicial Code to the contrary,
said . . . court shall have the power . . . to issue an order . . . enjoin-
ing them from instituting or prosecuting any suit or prosecuting any
suit or proceeding in any state court."'19 Another reads: ". . . all claims
" Aultman & Taylor Co. v. Brumfield, 102 Fed. 7 (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1900),
appeal dismissed, 22 Sup. Ct. 938 (1901). This case also disapproved a dictum
in Touchman v. Welch, 42 Fed. 548, 557 (C. C. D. Kan. 1890) which expressed
the opinion that the Civil Rights Act was an exception to the "anti-injunction"
statute. Hemsley v. Meyers, 45 Fed. 283 (C. C. D. Kan. 1891). Cf. International
Longshoremen's & Ware. Union v. Ackerman, 82 F. Supp. 65 (D. Hawaii 1948),
where an injunction against pending criminal proceedings in the territorial court
was issued, based upon, among other things, the Civil Rights Act. Evidently
there was no appeal from this decision. In a later case decided by the Court of
Appeals, Alesna v. Rice, 172 F. 2d 176 (9th Cir. 1949), in which an injunction
was sought against a territorial court of Hawaii, the injunction was refused, the
court stating "Nor does the complaint allege any of the facts which the decision
of the District Court found in (the Ackerman case)." This seems to be a "back
handed" approval of the Ackerman decision.
. Also, no leading article on the subject has mentioned the Civil Rights Act
when listing the Congressional exceptions. See MooRE, COMMENTARY ON THE
U. S. JUDICIAL CODE 110.03(49) p. 410; Barrett, Federal Injunction Against Pro-
ceedings in State Courts, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 545, 559 (1947).
"' See Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U. S. 496, 510 (1938).
"lI re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200 (1888); cf. Douglass v. City of Jeanette, 319
U. S. 157, rehearing denied, 319 U. S. 782 (1943); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U. S.
496 (1938).
"Interpleader Act of 1926, 44 STAT. 416 (1926), amending the Interpleader
Act of 1917, 39 STAT. 927 (1917). This provision was retained in the Interpleader
Act of 1936, 49 STAT. 1096, 28 U. S. C. §41 (26) (1936). See Treinies v. Sunshine
Mining Co., 308 U. S. 66, 74 (1939). In the new Judicial Code the wording was
changed. Since the "anti-inj unction" statute had been amended, there was no
"provision of the Judicial Code to the contrary." The Act now reads: ". . . a
district court may issue its ... order restraining (the claimants) from instituting
or prosecuting any proceeding in any State . . . court. . . ." 62 STAT. 970, 28
U. S. C. §2361 (1949) ; see 28 U. S. C. A. §2361, Reviser's note (1949).
[Vol. 29
NOTES AND COMMENTS
and proceedings . . . shall cease" ;20 and others have similar wording
clearly indicating than an exception was intended. 21
It is true that injunction has been used in many cases to prevent
enforcement of unconstitutional state statutes or city ordinances, or to
restrain the enforcemen t of valid acts in an unconstitutional manner.
The Civil Rights Act has formed the basis for such action.2 2 But, it is
to be noted that in these cases no proceedings had been instituted and
therefore such action did not come within the purview of the "anti-
injunction" statute.3
It thus seems that the court's position is rather tenuous in holding
that the Civil Rights Act constitutes an express exception to the "anti-
injunction" statute.
(2) Is it ever proper for a federal court to enjoin criminal proceed-
ings in a state court, once the proceedings have been instituted?
This question has presented itself almost exclusively in cases where
injunction was sought to restrain prosecution under an alleged uncon-
stitutional state statute or city ordinance,2 4 or, as in the principal case,
where acts of state officers are alleged to be unconstitutional. 25 Few
of these cases have mentioned the "anti-injunction" statute,26 most being
decided upon general rules of equity practice.
The equitable rule, as often stated, is that courts of equity do not
ordinarily restrain criminal prosecutions. This rule is limited by two
exceptions: first, criminal proceedings will be enjoined when irreparable
injury to property is threatened; and second, criminal proceedings will
" Limitation on shipowners liability, based on the Act of 1851, 9 STAT. 635
(1851). See Providence & N. Y. S. S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U. S. 578, 599
(1883).
"Frazier-Lemke Act, 47 STAT. 1473 (1933), 11 U. S. C. §203 (1940) "... the
following proceedings shall not be instituted, or if instituted . . . , shall not be
maintained, in any court... ."; Emergency Price Control Act, 56 STAT. 23 (1942),
50 U. S. C. App. §925 (1944) ". .. he may make application to the appropriate
court for an order enjoining such acts or practices ....
-" See Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U. S. 157, rehearing denied, 319 U. S.
782 (1943) ; Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U. S. 496 (1938).
-a See note 26 infra. 13 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE §6676 (2d ed.19414).194x parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908); Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387
(1940) ; Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1940); Spielman Motor Sales
Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89 (1934); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266
U. S. 497 (1924).
- Essanay Film Mfg. Co. v. Kane, 258 U. S. 358 (1922) ; Reagan v. Farmers
Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362 (1894).
2 The issue has been raised in the following cases, and in each case the court
held that the statute applied to criminal proceedings which were actually pending
in the state courts, but not to those which were threatened. Jewel Tea Co. v.
Lee's Summit, Mo., 198 Fed. 532, 539 (D. C. Mo. 1912), aff'd, 217 Fed. 965
(8th Cir. 1914); Kansas City Gas Co. v. Kansas City, 198 Fed. 500, 525 (D. C.
Mo. 1912); St. Louis & S. F. R.R. v. Allen, 181 Fed. 710, 722 (C. C. D. Ark.
1910).
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be enjoined when an equity action is pending, and the criminal action
is commenced by one of the parties to the equity action to determine
the same right that is in issue in the equity action.27  Both appear, on
the surface, to be exceptions to the "anti-injunction" statute as well as
to the equitable rule, and such is the opinion of at least one writer.28
However, a close examination of the cases will reveal that only the sec-
ond can accurately be so classified.
The first exception concerns, in reality, a question of what consti-
tutes a proceeding in a state court. In stating this exception to the
rule, the courts have failed, in most cases, to differentiate between
threatened proceedings and pending proceedings. As a practical matter,
however, the word 'proceeding" as used in this connection contemplates
threatened proceedings. Thus, courts have scrupulously avoided enjoin-
ing criminal proceedings which were actually pending in a state court,
unless the case came within the second exception. Strict adherence to
this equitable policy has made unnecessary resort to the "anti-injunction"
statute.
30
The second exception to the equitable rule is not inconsistent with
the provisions of the "anti-injunction" statute. Prior to the passage of
the amended statute, federal courts could enjoin state court proceed-
ings which sought to exercise jurisdiction over persons or things, over
which the federal court had already acquired jurisdiction.31 This rule,
" Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 143 (1923).
'8 Barrett, Federal Injunction Against Proceedings in State Courts, 35 CALIF.
L. REv. 545, 551 (1947). The author does, however, make a distinction between
pending actions and threatened actions, treating only the latter as an exception to
the "anti-injunction" statute. See also Warren, Federal and State Court Intcr-ference, 43 HARv. L. REv. 345, 375 (1930).
"Looney v. Eastern Texas R.R., 247 U. S. 214, 221 (1917) ; Prout v. Starr,
188 U. S. 537, 544 (1902).
" In Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445 (1927), injunction was granted
against threatened prosecutions under an unconstitutional state statute, but the
court refused to enjoin a proceeding which had been instituted. The court quoted
Ex parte Young 209 U. S. 123 (1908) in support ("But the federal court cannot,
of course, interfere in a case where the proceedings were already pending in a
state court."), and disapproved a dictum in Davis & Farnum Co. v. Los Angeles,
189 U. S. 207 (1903) which stated a contrary view. Accord, Caldwell v. Sioux
Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U. S. 559 (1917). See Note, 10 MINN. L. REV. 153(1926). Contra, International Longshoremen's & Ware. Union v. Ackerman, 82
F. Supp. 65 (D. C. Hawaii 1948).
" As to "things" there has never been any controversy, this being the so-called
res exception, recognized as valid by the Toicey case; but as to "persons" there
has been a divergence of authority. If the "person" is under the authority of a
court of another jurisdiction, then this is also an exception. Ponzi v. Fessenden,
258 U. S. 254 (1922). But if a mere right or liability between persons is con-
cerned, a different question is presented. In the Toucey case it was said that the
"first come, first served" doctrine of cases similar to Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S.
537 (1902) was discarded by Mine v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U. S. 226 (1922)
where it was held that mere in personam actions did not come within this ex-
ception. These cases are the "ancilliary" cases which were questioned by the
Toucey case, and later incorporated into the amended act. See note 32 infra.
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expressly incorporated in the amended act,32 thus includes the second
exception to the equitable rule.
Since the instant case is not of the latter type, and as the criminal
proceedings had already been instituted, the inference of the court that
it could enjoin the proceedings violates the provisions of the "anti-
injunction" statute as well as the long standing equitable doctrine.
Nevertheless, the court's action in Cooper v. Hutchinson, in refus-
ing to grant injunction, and in remanding to the district court pending
a ruling by the state court on the constitutional issues was not detri-
mental to either party. It did not delay the state's administration of
criminal justice, and resulted in disposition of the case without necessity
of appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court.3 3 This is not the first
time such relief has been employed, 34 and it appears that it is to be
preferred to dismissal or an order enjoining the court proceedings where
the propriety of injunction is questionable.
RICHARD DEY. MANNING.
Liens-Priority of Federal Claims Over Attachments
A creditor brought an action on an unsecured promissory note and
on the same day attached four parcels of real estate belonging to the
debtor to secure payment of any judgment recovered in the action. After
levy of the attachment, which was duly recorded, a federal tax lien' on
all of the debtor's property, including the previously attached real estate,
was recorded. Subsequently, the creditor recovered judgment in his
action on the promissory note. In a suit to determine priority of liens
on the real property, a California district appellate court found that
the attachment was a specific and perfected lien, and following the gen-
eral rule of "first in time of recordation, first in priority," the attach-
ment was superior to the federal tax lien.2  The California Supreme
Court declined to hear the case and the United State Supreme Court
granted certiorari. By a unanimous vote, the Supreme Court held that
the federal tax lien was superior to the contingent or inchoate attach-
321"... except . . . where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction. . . ." 62 STAT.
968, 28 U. S. C. §2283 (1948).
" Following the decision of the instant case, the trial judge issued a rule to
show cause to the parties involved. This was never heard, as the three New York
attorneys voluntarily requested permission to withdraw from the case, which per-
mission was granted.
" Railroad Comm. of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941) (first case
in which this type of relief used) ; A. F. of L. v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582 (1946);
Specter Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101 (1944).
' INT. Rrv. CODE §§3670-3672.
'Winther v. Morrison, 93 Cal. App. 2d 608, 209 P. 2d 657 (1949).
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ment lien, reversing the judgment of the state court.3
It is generally stated that the law of attachment as it exists in the
United States is in derogation of the common law, and there is no right
of attachment unless provided by statute.4 Although the precise details
of attachment statutes vary among the states, the underlying purpose
of attachment remains the same; ". . the word 'attachment,' as ordi-
narily understood in American law, has reference to a writ the object
of which is to hold property to abide the order of the court for the
payment of a judgment in the event the debt shall be established ....
The usual and practical theory is that an attachment creates a lien on
the property attached,6 which is a vested interest of the creditor.7
Inasmuch as the basic purpose of an attachment is to hold the prop-
erty of the debtor to secure any judgment which may be recovered, the
courts have under certain fact situations described the attachment lien
as inchoate or contingent. For example, if the attachment was never
followed by a judgment it would not prevail over an intervening re-
corded mortgage.8 And makers of a note who pay installments to
payee's attaching creditor, who thereafter does not pursue his right to
execution of judgment, are still liable for such payments to payee's
other lien creditor.0 On the other hand, where the attachment lien is
not permitted to lapse by failure to proceed to judgment in due time, the
language of the decisions with reference to the type of lien created by
attachment, before judgment, is quite different. 10 When the attachment
'United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 71 Sup. Ct. 111 (1950)
(Justice Jackson has a concurring opinion, p. 114). The creditor had died and
the Security Trust and Savings Bank as executor of his will was substituted.
"Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215, 222 (1904) ; Mitchell v. St. Maxent's Lessee,
4 Wall. 237, 243 (U. S. 1823) ; Bethel v. Lee, 200 N. C. 755, 758, 158 S. E. 493,
494 (1931). For comments on attachment law in the colonies see Peck v. Jenness,
7 How. 612, 620 (U. S. 1848).
'Wilder v. Inter-Island Steam Nay. Co., 211 U. S. 239, 245 (1908). See also
CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. §537 (1949) and N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-440.1(a) (1949 Supp.).
'Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612 (U. S. 1848).
" McGaffey Canning Co. v. Bank of America, 109 Cal. App. 415, 294 Pac. 45
(1930) (creditor has tort action against one wrongfully interfering with his
attachment lien).
'Pratt v. Law, 9 Cranch 456, 497 (U. S. 1815).
" "The attaching creditor obtains only a potential right or a contingent lien
and in order to discharge their liability, defendants should have made all pay-
ments to the sheriff in accordance with ... the Code . . ." (instead of to attaching
creditor). Puissegur v. Yarbrough, 29 Cal. 2d 409, 412, 175 P. 2d 830, 831 (1946).
" Horan v. Varian, 204 Cal. 391, 268 Pac. 637 (1928) (attachment has priority
over a secret existing but unrecorded deed) ; Thomas v. Burnett, 128 Ill. 37, 21
N. E. 352 (1889) (attaching creditor has priority over existing unrecorded deed
-although he received notice of deed prior to judgment); Sanborn, McDuffee Co.
v. Keefe, 88 N. H. 236, 187 Atl. 97 (1936) (attachment is good as against en-
cumbrances intervening between attachment and execution) ; United States v.
Yates, 204 S. W. 2d 399 (1947) (Texas Court of Civil Appeals held an attach-




is followed by a judgment, the rationale of the decisions is that the
attachment lien merges in the lien of judgment to preserve the priority,"
or the judgment lien relates back to the date of the attachment lien and
is effective from that date.1 2 A study of the cases emphasizes the neces-
sity of viewing expositions concerning the general nature of the attach-
ment lien with considerable caution. The descriptive excerpts, as such,
are irreconcilable and are made meaningful only when interpreted in
the light of the fact setting involved. For example, the California
courts have, in separate decisions, what purport to be general descrip-
tions of an attachment lien in precisely contradictory terms.' 3 While
the courts have justifiably held an attachment lien inferior to another
lien under one set of facts, and superior in another fact setting, there
unfortunately and unnecessarily have been too many attempts to describe
the general nature and effect of an attachment lien in terms of the
immediate set of facts then confronting the court. 14  The consequence
of this has been an accumulation of inconsistent reasoning more than
inconsistent results. So long as the trite but still pertinent exhortation,
"Interpret the language of the case in terms of the facts therein," is
obeyed, the lack of clear and consistent explanations is not as likely to
be a substantial impediment in reaching desirable and correct results.
Courts, however, sometimes fail to heed the admonition. And in the
principal case, this indiscriminate use of descriptive language by Cali-
" Balzano v. Traeger, 93 Cal. App. 640, 270 Pac. 249 (1928) ; Brun v. Evans,
197 Cal. 439, 241 Pac. 86 (1925); cf. Hambley Co. v. White Co., 192 N. C. 31,
133 S. E. 399 (1926); Cook v. N. Y. Corundrum Mining Co., 114 N. C. 617, 19
S. E. 664 (1894).
1" Martinovich v. Marsicano, 150 Cal. 597, 89 Pac. 333 (1907) ; Board of Super-
visors v. Hart, 210 La. 78, 26 So. 2d 361 (1946); Campbell v. Keys, 130 Mich.
127, 89 N. W. 720 (1902); Smart v. Burgess, 35 R. I. 149, 85 Att. 742 (1913).
The relation back idea has been used in various lien situations to establish a
priority over a federal tax lien: In re Taylorcraft Aviation Corp., 168 F. 2d 808(6th Cir. 1948) (mechanic's lien relates back to time of performance of work) ;
United States v. Winnett, 165 F. 2d 149 (9th Cir. 1947) (right to set-off related
back to date of agreement and set-off right was superior to intervening tax lien) ;
New York Casualty Co. v. Zwerner, 58 F. Supp. 473 (N. D. Ill. 1944) (surety
company's equitable lien relates back to date of suretyship contract). Contra:
Miller v. Bank of America, 166 F. 2d 415 (9th Cir. 1948) ; Seaboard Surety Co.
v. United States, 67 F. Supp. 969 (Ct. Cl. 1946).
13 "The attaching creditor obtains only a potential right or a contingent
lien. . . ." Puissegur v. Yarbrough, 29 Cal. 2d 409, 412, 175 P. 2d 830, 831
(1946). "Since . . . the attachment herein was properly . . .levied . . .it is evi-
dent that Morrison perfected a lien thereon... !' Winther v. Morrison, 93 Cal.
App. 2d 608, 209 P. 2d 657, 659 (1949) (italics added). The contradictory de-
scriptions of the nature of the attachment lien are found elsewhere. Compare 5
AM. JUR. ArrAcirMENT §815 with §827 of the same reference. See 7 C. J. S.
ATTAcHMENT §256.
14 Although criticism at this juncture may seem "hindsight more omniscient
than foresight" it appears to this writer that the language ("contingent lien") was
unnecessary to the decision in Puissegur v. Yarbrough, supra note 13. It would
have been sufficient to have asserted against the defendants that they had failed
to observe the requirements of the California statutes.
1951]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
fornia courts concerning the nature of an attachment lien (contingent
and inchoate on one occasion, and specific and perfected on another)
acted somewhat as a boomerang on a decision by courts of that state.15
Nevertheless, when the issue is the relative priority of a recorded
attachment lien and a subsequently recorded private10 creditor's lien,
the courts will usually apply the rule of "first in time of recordation,
first in priority."'17
Section 3466 of the Revised Statutes,'8 the basic provisions of which
were enacted in 1797,19 provides for a priority of payment of federal
debts under specified circumstances but does not create any lien.20 The
interpretation of Section 3466 has had a long and tortuous history.2'
Although the language of the statute appeared to give the federal claim
priority over all other creditors without exception, a dictum in the early
case of Thelusson v. Snitht2 2 indicated that a "specific and perfected"
"'The United States Supreme Court used this language in reversing the Cali-
fornia court: ". . . if the state court itself describes the lien as inchoate, this
classification is 'practically conclusive. . . .' The Supreme Court of California
has so described its attachment lien in the case of Puissegur v. Yarbrough. .. ."
United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 71 Sup. Ct. 111, 113 (1950).
The Court clearly did not interpret the language of the California court "in the
light of the facts of the case" and it ignored the effect of other California de-
cisions concerning the nature of an attachment lien, including the state decision
it overruled.
1 As developed in this comment infra, if the competing claim is held by the
federal government, the result will be different under the rule of the principal case,
United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 71 Sup. Ct. 111 (1950).
" See notes 10, 11 and 12 supra.
1831 U. S. C. §191 (1946) : "Whenever any person indebted to the United
States is insolvent or whenever the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands
of the executors or administrators, is insufficient to pay all the debts due from
the deceased, the debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied; and the
priority established shall extend as well to cases in which a debtor, not having
sufficient property to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or
in which the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor are
attached by process of law, as to cases in which an act of bankruptcy is committed."
" 1 STAT. 515 (1797). Under the English common law the priority of pay-
ment of debts due to the government was a prerogative of the crown, but in the
United States this right of priority has been held to be entirely dependent upon
the acts of Congress. Mellon v. Michigan Trust Co., 271 U. S. 236, 239 (1926) ;
United States v. State Bank, 6 Pet. 29, 35 (U. S. 1832). But cf. the language
of United States v. Snyder, 149 U. S. 210, 214 (1892).
20 "Under this act these rules have been clearly established: First, no lien is
created; second, the priority established can never attach while the debtor con-
tinues the owner and in possession of the property, though he may be unable to
pay all his debts; third, no evidence can be received of the insolvency of the
debtor until he has been divested of his property in one of the modes stated; and
fourth, whenever the debtor is thus divested of his property, the person who
becomes invested with the title is thereby made a trustee for the United States. . .
Beaston v. Farmers' Bank, 12 Pet. 102, 132 (U. S. 1838).
1 See Rogge, The Differences in the Priority of the United States i Bank-
raptcy and in Equity Receiverships, 43 HARV. L. REV. 251 (1929) ; Note, 56 YALE
L. 1. 1258 (1947).
22 Wheat. 396, 426 (U. S. 1817) (a judgment not yet levied was not a suffi-
ciently perfected lien). See the surprising reference to this case in Conard v.
Atlantic Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 386, 451 (U. S. 1828), concurring opinion by
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lien would prevail over Section 3466 priority. Though repeated with
varying degrees of assurance in later cases,2 and urged upon the Court
many times, 24 the Court has assiduously avoided a direct answer by
finding that the lien competing with the federal priority was not suffi-
ciently "specific and perfected. ' ' 25  Again, this was true in the recent
case of Illitwis v. Campbell.2 6 In this case the Court stated that a lien
must be definite in "at least three respects" 27 in order to overcome the
priority of Section 3466: (1) the identity of the lienor ;28 (2) the amount
of the lien ;29 (3) the property to which the lien attaches.30
A general statutory lien is provided for in Section 3670 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code,3 ' which arises at the time the assessment list is
received by the internal revenue collector,32 and which attaches to after-
acquired property as well as present property rights of the debtor.3
Originally Congress made no provision for recordation of federal tax
liens arising under Section 3670. Perhaps influenced by the decision
of the Court in United States v. Snyder,3 4 which brought out the
menace of this secret, unrecorded lien to the security of land titles and
to all lien creditors' rights, Congress in 1913 provided that the tax lien
Justice Johnson: ". . . I have long wished for an opportunity to put on record
some remarks upon the report of the case of Thelusson v. Smith. I have never
acknowledged its authority in my circuit . . . the question there supposed to be
decided really never was raised. . . . The reporter has omitted one very material
fact . . . which was, that the United States had no interest in the issue, since
their judgment had been voluntarily paid off by the assignees of ... the bankrupt."
"See Savings and Loan Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421, 428(1898): "This court has always held that a mortgage of real estate, made in
good faith by a debtor to secure a private debt, is a conveyance of such an interest
in the land, as will defeat the priority given to the United States ... " See
Illinois v. Campbell, 329 U. S. 362, 378 (1946) (dissenting opinion).
" Illinois v. Campbell, 329 U. S. 362 (1946); United States v. Waddill, 323
U. S. 353 (1945) ; United States v. Texas, 314 U. S. 480 (1941) ; United States
v. Knott, 298 U. S. 544 (1936); New York v. Maclay, 288 U. S. 290 (1933);
Spokone County v. United States, 279 U. S. 80 (1921); Thelusson v. Smith, 2
Wheat. 396 (U. S. 1817).
" See 33 VA. L. REv. 353 (1947) ; cases cited note 24 supra.
20329 U. S. 362 (1946) (Illinois had recorded notice of unemployment com-
pensation taxes due and asserted a lien upon all the personal property owned and
used by lienee in connection with its business. The court ruled that the Illinois
claim was not definite and certain as to the property).
27 Illinois v. Campbell, 329 U. S. 362, 375 (1946).
20 Lien on securities deposited with state official for benefit of possible future
creditors of surety company was inchoate for lack of ascertained lien creditor.
United States v. Knott, 298 U. S. 544, 550 (1936).
20 Landlord's lien for rents accruing in the future not certain in amount when
federal priority arose. United States v. Waddill, 323 U. S. 353 (1945).
20 See note 26 supra.
2126 U. S. C. §3670 (1946).
O'2INT. Ray. CODE §§3670 and 3671. See In re Victor Brewing Co., 54 F.
Supp. 11 (W. D. Pa. 1944), aff'd, 146 F. 2d 831 (3d Cir.).
"2 Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U. S. 265 (1945). See Clark, Federal
Tax Liens and Their Enforceinent, 33 VA. L. Rzv. 13 (1947).
24 149 U. S. 210 (1892). See Note 33 supra.
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should not be valid against a purchaser, mortgagee, or judgment creditor
until the lien was recorded.35 In 1939 this protection was extended to
a pledgee, and another amendment provided that the lien, even if re-
corded, should not be valid as against a mortgagee, pledgee, or purchaser
of securities who gave full consideration for such securities without
actual knowledge of the tax lien.36  As the present law requires re-
cordation of the of the tax lien as against subsequent purchasers, judg-
ment creditors, mortgagees and pledgees, it logically follows that a lien
under Section 3670 would not be superior to prior recorded claims of
a purchaser, judgment creditor, mortgagee or pledgee.3T But the stand-
ing of the claimant who does not fall into one of these categories, 8 and
who has recorded his claim prior to the time the tax lien arose, is not
expressly dealt with by statute. Prior to the principal case the decisions
on this point were in conflict. For example, in Board of Supervisors
v. Hart,39 the federal tax lien was recorded subsequent to an attachment
but prior to judgment. The tax lien was held subordinate on the theory
that the judgment related back to the date of attachment and was
superior to any intervening liens.40  On the other hand, in the similar
case of Miller v. Bank of America , 41 it was held that a tax lien was
superior to an attachment pursued to judgment on the ground that, under
the California law, no lien was acquired on personalty by a judgment
until levy of execution.
42
In the principal case, the Supreme Court did not find the relation-
back theory acceptable.43  Neither did it think that the attachment lien
was specific and perfected. The Court relied on language from a pre-
vious California decision,44 and saw an analogy in cases arising under
" INT. REV. CoDE §3672(a).
" INT. RFv. CODE §3672(b).
"' In the principal case, the Government did not contest the priority of a mort-
gage recorded prior to the time the tax lien arose.
For example, an attachment creditor.
210 La. 78, 26 So. 2d 361 (1946). This case was not appealed.
"o Accord, United States v. Winnett, 165 F. 2d 149 (9th Cir. 1947) (right of
set-off related back to date of contract, taking priority over intervening tax lien) ;
United States v. Sampsell, 153 F. 2d 731 (9th Cir. 1946); New York Casualty
Co. v. Zwerner, 58 F. Supp. 473 (N. D. Ill. 1944) ; .In re Van Winkle, 49 F. Supp.
711 (W. D. Ky. 1943); United States v. 52.11 Acres of Land, 73 F. Supp. 820
(E. D. Mo. 1947); United States v. Yates, 204 S. W. 2d 399 (1947). Bilt cf.
MacKenzie v. United States, 109 F. 2d 450 (9th Cir. 1940) (tax lien arose be-
fore attachment but was not recorded and tax lien held superior).
"' 166 F. 2d 415 (9th Cir. 1948) (no discussion of the effect of the attachment).
"2 But see Balzano v. Traeger, 93 Cal. App. 640, 270 Pac. 249 (1928) (lien
of attachment on personalty continues after judgment to preserve the lien and
its priority); Bank of America v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 303 (N. D. Cal.
1946) ; United States v. Record Pub. Co., 60 F. Supp. 194 (N. D. Cal. 1945).
' "Nor can the doctrine of relation back . . . operate to destroy the realities
of the situation." United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 71 Sup. Ct.
111, 113 (1950).
"4 See note 15 supra.
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Section 3466.4 5  The refusal of the Court to adopt the relation-back
doctrine could be justified under a strict reading of the statute.46 How-
ever, the persistence of the Court in finding as inchoate and contingent
any lien which is competing against a federal tax lien or priority under
Section 3466 seems less justifiable.4 7 Such language with respect to an
attachment lien seems to ignore the fundamental purpose of an attach-
ment. Although it is quite true that the right to realize upon the
attached property is contingent upon a subsequent judgment,48 if the
attachment is to be effective as a lien, it must fill the office of a valid
lien prior to any judgment in the action.4 9 Otherwise, the creditor would
just as well save his efforts and abide his time until he has a judgment
to record.50
"See notes 24 and 28-30 supra.
INT. REv. CODE §3672(a): "Such lien shall not be valid as against any
mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice thereof has been
filed. . . ." It could be reasoned that to adopt the relation-back doctrine would
in substance be inserting into the statute the additional words, "attachment
creditor."
"' Mr. Justice Jackson in a concurring opinion thought that the history of the
statute required giving the tax lien priority over the attachment lien, as more in
keeping with the intention of Congress. What seems to be a significant sentence
in H. R. REP. No. 1018, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912), which Justice Jackson cited,
was not quoted: "There is no reason why the Government should not occupy the
same position with reference to liens on property as does the individual" (italics
added). While this sentence could not, of course, be interpreted as an express
statement of the Committee concerning an attachment lien, it does perhaps argue
for more lenient treatment of private creditor's liens on an occasion when the
statute is silent.
," It should be remembered that short of payment, something usually remains to
be done with any lien. A mortgage, whether in a lien or title jurisdiction, must
be foreclosed. See Meyer's Estate, 159 Pa. Super. 296, 48 A. 2d 210 (1946).
" It might be argued that the attaching creditor does not lose anything if his
attachment is overreached by other lien creditors, as he did not have any security
to begin with, and did not expect any. But this would be an argument to do
away with the whole body of attachment law. Furthermore, the attachment lien
does protect the creditor against a fruitless suit and the expense of litigation, and
the peril of having a judgment with nothing to levy upon. The reasons for giving
the attaching creditor a lien on the debtor's property are indeed quite similar to
those applicable for the judgment creditor's lien.
" The statutory provisions on attachments in North Carolina are set out in
N. C. GEN. STAT. §§1-440.1 through 1-440.57 (1949 Supp.). The North Carolina
statute is less extensive than the California statute, CAL. CODE CIV. Paoc. ANN. §537
(1946), in that in North Carolina an attachment may be issued against a resident
only when he (the debtor) with intent to defraud his creditors, is about to or
has removed, assigned or otherwise disposed of his property. N. C. GEN. STAT.
§1-440.3(5) (1949 Supp.). It would therefore seem that the situation which per-
mits the creditor to attach the resident debtor's property is the situation which
invokes the priority statute, R. S. §3466. See note 18 supra. But this assumes
that the debtor is not thrown into bankruptcy. Since acts which call R. S. §3466
into play may also justify an involuntary petition in bankruptcy, if this results,
the order of distribution under Sec. 64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C.
§104 (1946) gives the United States a fifth priority. Furthermore, under the
Bankruptcy Act, See. 67, inchoate liens are specifically protected so that if an
attachment lien is so denominated, it would have priority over the federal tax
claim. See Sarner, Correlation of Priority and Lien Rights in the Collection of
Federal Taxes, 95 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 739, 743 (1947). Where the attachment
19511
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The fact that a federal tax lien is in the race for priority should
not serve to change the fundamental nature and purpose of competing
liens.51 The desirability as well as' the Constitutional requirement of
a uniform tax policy throughout the country need not be argued, nor
the necessity that the federal government secure needed revenue for the
public benefit. What may be doubted is the contention of some that
the public benefit is or would be served by subordinating all lien holders
to the tax claims of the United States.53  When this would not result
in an appreciable amount of revenue in the aggregate, 54 and would often
operate quite unjustly by imposing relatively heavy losses upon indi-
vidual private creditors, the public benefit involved would seem highly
dubious.
Congress has by successive amendments since 1913 55 greatly re-
stricted the scope of the original secret, unrecorded federal tax lien.
This fact plus a House Committee declaration that "There is no reason
why the Government should not occupy the same position with reference
to liens on property as does the individual"56 would seem to make out
a good case why the federal courts should not give effect to a secret,
unrecorded tax lien by the judicial process of defining a competing lien
as "contingent and inchoate. '57 Yet, the reluctance of the Supreme
is on property of a nonresident (N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-440.3(1) (1949 Supp.)
or a foreign corporation (N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-440.3(2) (1949 Supp.) without
regard to any attempt to defraud creditors, R. S. §3466 would not necessarily be
invoked. In this case, the North Carolina attachment creditor would likely still
find his attachment lien inferior to a federal tax lien under INT. REv. CODE §3670
which intervened between attachment and judgment, under the rule of the prin-
cipal case.
"'E.g., see Doe v. Childress, 24 Wall. 642 (U. S. 1874) as to the effect of
an attachment where no tax lien was involved.
"
2 U. S. CONsT. Art. I §8.
""In insolvency proceedings some claimants are certain to suffer. There is no
reason why lien holders should be preferred over the United States. Since the
priority accorded claims of the United States is for the purpose of securing rev-
enue for the public benefit, the United States has a stronger argument for prior
payment of its claims against an insolvent estate than does a lien holder whose
interest is purely private." Sarner sipra note 51, at 746-747. This author assumes
without discussion what seems to be a debatable proposition: Would the public
welfare in fact be served by giving the United States preference over all lien
holders?
" See H. R. REP. No. 1018, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 1912 and H. R. REP. No. 855,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1939.
"' INT. REV. CODE §3672.
" H. R. REP. No. 1018, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 1912.
" From the view of strict statutory construction, the interpretations of the
Supreme Court are probably unassailable. But the Court has not limited itself
to such construction through the years, inasmuch as it has kept alive, by dicta, the
idea that a "specific and perfected" lien would not be overreached by federal
priority under R. S. §3466. See notes 23 and 24 szapra. The number of cases
heard on the point is evidence of the reliance which litigants have put on the
6ften repeated dicta, as well as of great differences of opinion as to what con-
stittites a "specific and perfected" lien. In an area of the law where certainty is
an unusually desirable factor, the Supreme Court has often contributed to uncer-
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Court to find a sufficiently "specific and perfected" lien under Revised
Statutes, Section 3466, and now under Section 3670 of the Internal
Revenue Code, indicates that amendments to these two sections are
highly desirable. Such amendments should bring these sections into
conformity with the federal priority philosophy Congress has expressed
elsewhere,5 8 thereby eliminating the remaining vestiges of the secret,
unrecorded federal claim and achieving a greater degree of certainty
as to creditors' rights. These goals appear impossible of attainment




The failure of a traveler crossing a railroad to obtain a clear view
of the track from any point, when he may do so in safety, renders him
contributorily negligent as a matter of law in North Carolina, and his
case will not be allowed to go to the jury.' This rule was recently
illustrated by the case of Parker v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.2  Plaintiff
stopped at a farm crossing with the front of his truck eight or ten feet
from the near rail, at a point where an embankment prevented his see-
ing more than seventy-five to eighty yards up the track. He then
entered the crossing and collided with a train. The court held motion
for nonsuit should have been granted since plaintiff's evidence disclosed
that he could have stopped in safety at a point which afforded him clear
vision. This rule has had sustained approval since Harrison v. North
Carolina R.R.,3 but its application has not always been certain.
The general principles of the duty of a traveler in crossing a rail-
road track have been many times repeated.4 It is generally held that
tainty. For an excellent example of the effect on lower federal courts, see Bank
of Wrangell v. Alaska Lumber Mills, 84 F. Supp. 1 (D. C. Alaska 1949) (ad-
mitting the impossibility of reconciling the decisions, and the dicta, the court held
that a mortgage, in a lien jurisdiction, was superior to federal priority under
Section 3466).
18 The Bankruptcy Act §§64 and 67, 30 STAT. 563 (1898), as amended, 11
U. S. C. §104 (1946) and 30 STAT. 564 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. §107(1946).
'This rule, of course, assumes the existence of some negligence on the part
of the defendant railroad, which will generally be a failure to give proper -warn-
ing. This note does not attempt to deal with the problem of what constitutes neg-
ligence on the part of the railroad. For a general discussion of the problem of
crossing accidents see Blair, Automobile Accidents at Railroad Crossings in North
Carolina, 23 N. C. L. REv. 223 (1945).
2 232 N. C. 472, 61 S. E. 2d 370 (1950).
3194 N. C. 656, 140 S. E. 598 (1927).
'The basic North Carolina cases on duties of both parties at a railroad cross-
ing are probably Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 163 N. C. 431, 79 S. E. 690
(1913) ; Coleman v. A. C. L. R.R., 153 N. C. 322, 69 S. E. 251 (1910) ; Cooper
v. N. C. R.R., 140 N. C. 209, 52 S. E. 932 (1905).
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the duty to stop, look, and listen is relative, depending on the situation
in the particular case. A failure to exercise these precautions is a cir-
cumstance for the consideration of the jury in determining contributory
negligence,5 though in some states a failure to stop is contributory
negligence as a matter of law.6
The duty to stop arises most frequently in cases where there is
some obstruction to the view of the track immediately adjacent to the
crossing. The greater the danger at a crossing, the greater is the care
required of both the traveler and the railroad.1 The increased duty of
the railroad to give warning may be taken into account by the traveler
in crossing and by the court in establishing the standard of care required
of him.8 The duty to look and listen is continuing and should be per-
formed at a time and place when looking and listening will be effective. 9
The traveler must select a vantage point from which he can see the
track, even though he may have stopped once already where the view
was obstructed.' 0 The precise number of feet from the track where
observation should be made cannot be set down as a rule," but the duty
does not require that a traveler go beyond a place of safety into the
zone of danger itself.12
If vision is completely obstructed by obstacles or obscured by weather
conditions, or if a clear view may be obtained only in the area of danger
itself, the traveler in going forward may ordinarily rely on his sense
of hearing and on the increased duty of the railroad to give warning."8
There is no absolute duty for the driver of a vehicle to alight and look
up and down the track before proceeding across.
14
' Pokora v. Wabash R.R., 292 U. S. 98 (1933) ; Elliot v. Chicago, M. & St. P.
Ry., 150 U. S. 245 (1893); Harris v. Black Mountain Ry., 199 N. C. 798, 156
S. E. 102 (1930). N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-143 (1943) specifies that a failure to
stop shall not be contributory negligence per se, and this is interpreted to mean
that a failure to stop is a circumstance to be considered in determining con-
tributory negligence, whether by the court or the jury. Conn v. Seaboard Air
Line Ry., 201 N. C. 157, 159 S. E. 331 (1931).
'This is known as the "Pennsylvania Rule.' Benner v. Philadelphia & R.
KR., 262 Pa. 307, 105 Atl. 283 (1918).
" Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 163 N. C. 431, 79 S. E. 690 (1913).8 Pokora v. Wabash R.R., 292 U. S. 98 (1933).
'Kilmer v. Norfolk & Western R.R., 45 F. 2d 532 (5th Cir. 1930); Godwin
v. A. C. L. R.R., 202 N. C. 1, 161 S. E. 541 (1941); Johnson v. Seaboard Air
Line Ry., 163 N. C. 431, 79 S. E. 690 (1913).
"o Pennsylvania Ry. v. Yingling, 158 Md. 169, 129 Atl. 36 (1925); Parker v.
A. C. L. R.R., 232 N. C. 472, 61 S.E. 2d 370 (1950).
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-143 (1943) requires motorists to stop within 50 feet
of the tracks.
2 Parker v. A. C. L. R.R., 232 N. C. 472, 61 S. E. 2d 370 (1950) ; Pokora v.
Wabash R.R., 292 U. S. 98 (1933).
" Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U. S. 98 (1933); Cooper v. N. C. R.R, 140
N. C. 209, 52 S. E. 932 (1905).
"' In a famous dictum, Justice Holmes once laid down the rule that the driver
must get out if necessary in order to see the track. B. & 0. R.R. v. Goodman,
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The above-mentioned principles have fairly general acceptance. It
is primarily in their application as a question of law for the court or
of fact for the jury that the differences among the various jurisdictions
appear. It is the general rule that where the view at a crossing is not
obstructed or obscured in any way, and the traveler enters upon the
crossing oblivious to his danger and is injured, he is guilty of con-
tributory negligence which bars his recovery as a matter of law."8 Of
course, if the plaintiff saw the train coming and still attempted unsuc-
cessfully to get across, nonsuit is proper.1 6
If the view of the tracks is in some way obstructed, the prevailing
rule seems to be that whether the traveler selected the proper place for
looking and listening is a question of fact for the jury, and the plaintiff
will not be denied recovery as a matter of law.17 Another line of
authority has developed since the much-discussed case of Baltimore &
Ohio Ry. v. Goodman,18 in which the United States Supreme Court
found contributory negligence as a matter of law where a motorist failed
to obtain a clear view in safety after passing obstructions close to the
track. As a part of this development, North Carolina, in the case of
Harrison v. North Caroliua R.R. (in which the court quoted exten-
sively from the Goodman opinion), switched over from its earlier ad-
herence to the general rule and held nonsuit proper in this situation.19
Since the Harrison case, North Carolina has applied its rule in numerous
other cases.
The practical application of the rule leaves questions in need oL
clarification. At what point does it become unsafe to approach closer
to a crossing in order to look, and at what point does it become per-
missible to rely upon the sense of hearing and upon warnings by the
railroad? The answer, of course, depends in large part upon the manner
275 U. S. 66 (1927). This rule was disavowed in Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292
U. S. 98 (1933), in which the court said that "a driver may learn nothing by
getting out about the perils which lurk beyond. By the time he regains his seat
and sets the car in motion, the hidden train may be upon him."
11 Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U. S. 98 (1933); Bailey v. N. C. R.R., 223
N. C. 244, 25 S. E. 2d 833 (1943).11 McCrimmon v. Powell, 221 N. C. 216, 19 S. E. 2d 880 (1942); Lamm v.
A. C. L. R.R., 213 N. C. 216, 195 S. E. 381 (1938).
7 Morgan v. Detroit, J. & C. R.R., 234 Mich. 497, 208 N. W. 434 (1926);
Newhard v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 Pa. 417, 26 Atl. 106 (1893); Morrissey v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 55 S. D. 497, 226 N. W. 731 (1920). Contra: Pokora
v. Wabash Ry., 292 U. S. 98 (1933); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Yingling, 148 Md.
169, 129 Atl. 136 (1925).
8 275 U. S. 66 (1927), where the obstructions were 18 feet from the track.
Comment 6 N. C. L. R1v. 212.
10 194 N. C. 656, 140 S. E. 598 (1927). The earlier North Carolina rule is
expressed in Shepard v. Norfolk & Southern R.R., 166 N. C. 539, 82 S. E. 872(1914), and Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 163 N. C. 431, 79 S. E. 690
(1913).
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of transportation and the degree of mobility which the traveler pos-
sesses.20  In reckoning the limit of distance from the track to which a
safe approach may be made with a vehicle, the overhang of the loco-
motive beyond the side of the track and the projection of the vehicle
forward of the driver have to be considered. 2 ' Secondly, how far must
the view of the track extend to be considered "clear"? In most of the
cases where nonsuit is granted, the track is "straight," or clear as "far
as you can see."2 2  Where witnesses have given estimates of the dis-
tance for which the view was clear, nonsuit has been granted when the
estimate was as low as seventy-five or eighty yards, but for the most
part the estimates have been several hundred yards or more.23  If the
view is not completely obstructed by virtue of some obstacle immediately
beside the crossing, but the lay of the track itself is such that an ap-
proaching train is hidden until it is almost upon the crossing, the chances
of getting to the jury increase. This may occur where the .track curves
sharply24 or is hidden from view by a deep cut or hollow.
25
2 Wehe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R., 97 Kan. 794, 156 P. 742 (1916).
"1 Thus it would seem that the closest safe distance for a motor vehicle would
be at a point where the driver would be in the neighborhood of 10 feet from the
track, allowing 2 to 3 feet for the locomotive overhang, 6 or 7 feet for the pro-jection of the vehicle in front of the driver, and clearance. Thus, where obstruc-
tions come to within 3 or 4 feet of the near rail, nonsuit is not granted. Lincoln
v. A. C. L. R.R., 207 N. C. 787, 178 S. E. 601 (1935) ; Collett v. Southern Ry.,
198 N. C. 760, 153 S. E. 405 (1930). The same decision was reached where the
obstruction was 8 to 10 feet from the near rail. White v. N. C. R.R., 216 N. C.
79, 3 S. E. 2d 310 (1939). A survey of the cases shows that the closest point
to which obstructions have extended with nonsuit resulting was 10 to 15 feet from
the track. Godwin v. A. C. L. R.R., 202 N. C. 1, 161 S. E. 541 (1931); Harrison
v. N. C. R.R., 194 N. C. 656, 140 S. E. 598 (1927). In Parker v. A. C. L. R.R.,
the driver stopped with the front end of his truck 8 to 10 feet from the track, and
this placed him about 15 feet away. For obstructions occurring beyond this range,
there have been numerous instances of nonsuit. Caruthers v. Southern Ry., 232
N. C. 183, 59 S. E. 2d 782 (1950) (24 feet); Hampton v. Hawkins, 219 N. C.
205, 13 S. E. 2d 227 (1941) (30 feet). Horsedrawn vehicles have a long pro-
jection forward of the driver and, in addition, probably would be allowed a greater
area of danger because of the excitability of the animals. Bicyclists and pedes-
trians have a much greater degree of mobility and a shorter distance of danger,
but even so, if a pedestrian has to look around a box car immediately beside the
track to see, the case may be allowed to go to the jury. Riggsbee v. A. C. L. R.R.,
190 N. C. 231, 129 S. E. 580 (1930). As a practical matter, it would seem un-
likely that obstructions would come to within 10 feet of the tracks except in the
case of other railway cars standing on a parallel track.
22 Boyd v. A. C. L. R.R., 232 N. C. 171, 59 S. E. 2d 789 (1950) ; McCrimmon
v. Powell, 221 N. C. 216, 19 S. E. 2d 880 (1942); Godwin v. A. C. L. R.R., 220
N. C. 281, 17 S. E. 2d 137 (1941).
-"Parker v. A. C. L. R.R., 232 N. C. 472, 61 S. E. 2d 370 (1950); Penland
v. Southern Ry., 228 N. C. 528, 46 S. E. 2d 303 (1948) ; Eller v. N. C. R.R., 200
N. C. 527, 157 S. E. 800 (1931). In Tart v. Southern Ry., 202 N. C. 52, 161
S. E. 720 (1931) the view was straight for three-quarters of a mile.2 Loflin v. N. C. R.R., 210 N. C. 404, 186 S. E. 493 (1936); Baker v. High
Point, T. & D. R.R., 202 N. C. 478, 163 S. E. 452 (1932); Moseley v. A. C. L.
R.R., 197 N. C. 628, 150 S. E. 184 (1929).
5 Bundy v. Powell, 229 N. C. 707, 51 S. E. 2d 307 (1948).
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The factors of decision are not so limited, however, as the foregoing
discussion might seem to indicate. In determining whether a case of
negligence and contributory negligence is one for the jury or one ex-
clusively for the court, "the factors of decision are numerous and com-
plicated, and practically every case must stand on its own bottom." 26
The fact that the traveler was familiar with the crossing or with the
train schedule is an additional factor in establishing negligence; con-
versely, unfamiliarity with either is an aid in getting to the jury.2 7 The
type of road crossing the track is also important, as obviously the
traveler has less reason to expect a warning and should use more care
at a farm crossing than at a major highway. 28 Other factors which
may have weight in carrying the case to the jury are fault of the rail-
road in causing the obstruction,29 presence of weather or heavy traffic
conditions increasing the difficulty of seeing,30 and some degree of reli-
ance by the traveler on the presence of a watchman or warning signals.3 1
Although for some time after the Harrison case the application of its
rule was somewhat uncertain, and although one case has suggested that
there are two lines of cases on the subject,32 it seems that the contra-
dictions may be explained in part by the presence of some of the above
factors and in part by an increasing tendency of the Court to decide
more railroad crossing cases as questions of law.
Where the obstruction to the view is of a temporary or transient
character the traveler must wait for it to cease or pass on, in order
effectively to fulfill his duty to look and listen.33 The prevailing rule
is that failure to wait until the view clears is contributory negligence
as a matter of law.34 North Carolina in following this rule grants non-
suit where the traveler fails to wait long enough to get a clear view after
2" Cole v. Koonce, 214 N. C. 188, 198 S. E. 637 (1938).
" Nonsuit was given in Riddle v. Southern Ry., 114 F. 2d 259 (M. D. N. C.
1940) ; Parker v. A. C. L. R.R., 232 N. C. 472, 61 S. E. 2d 370 (1950) ; Caruthers
v. Southern Ry., 232 N. C. 183, 59 S. E. 2d 782 (1950); and several other cases
in which familiarity was emphasized, and denied in Harper v. Seaboard Air Line
Ry., 211 N. C. 398, 190 S. E. 750 (1937), where the driver was unfamiliar with
the crossing.28 Parker v. A. C. L. R.R., 232 N. C. 472, 61 S. E. 2d 370 (1950).
2
" Hill v. Norfolk & Southern R.R., 195 N. C. 605, 143 S. E. 129 (1929);
Blum v. Southern Ry., 187 N. C. 640, 122 S. E. 562 (1924).
"oHarper v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 211 N. C. 398, 190 S. E. 750 (1937).
21 Finch v. N. C. R.R., 195 N. C. 190, 141 S. E. 550 (1928).
"2Eller v. N. C. R.R., 200 N. C. 527, 157 S. E. 800 (1931).
2 Pennsylvania R.R. v. Yingling, 148 Md. 169, 129 Atl. 36 (1925) ; Dickinson
v. Erie R.R., 81 N. J. L. 464, 81 Atl. 104 (1911) ; Eller v. N. C. R.R., 200 N. C.
527, 157 S. E. 800 (1931)
"4 Fletcher v. Fitchburg R.R., 149 Mass. 127, 21 N. E. 302 (1889); Penn-
sylvania R.R. v. Rusynik, 117 Ohio St. 530, 159 N. E. 826 (1927). Contra: Cook
v. A. C. L. R.R., 196 S. C. 230, 13 S. E. 2d 1 (1941).
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another train35 or automobile36 passes, or until smoke and steam from
another train lifts from the crossing.3
7
Where the view is obscured by adverse weather conditions, the
traveler may rely on warnings by the railroad and on greater use of
hearing. Thus, if there is fog 38 or snow,39 or the night is dark and
rainy,40 the jury is allowed to pass on the question of whether plaintiff
maintained a proper lookout. But the weather conditions must be such
as to cut down visibility substantially: a cold and foggy morning with
hazy atmosphere has been called a borderline case, 41 and a drizzling rain
in the daytime has been held not enough to prevent nonsuit. 42
Ordinarily the negligence of the driver of a vehicle will not be im-
puted to a passenger, but where the driver's negligence is so palpable
and gross as to be the proximate cause of the accident, it "insulates"
the first occurring negligence as a matter of law.43 Negligence of the
driver under the rule Harrison case in failing to obtain a clear view
after passing obstructions may have this result. But because the negli-
gence of the driver must be palpable and gross, the Court would prob-
ably be more reluctant to declare that the railroad's negligence was
insulated as a matter of law in a suit by a guest, on the same showing
of negligence. This relaxation of the rule would allow his case to go
to the jury where the obstruction to view was farther from the track
than would be allowed where the driver was suing.
44
The doctrine of "last clear chance" has not been applied in the
cases where the driver's failure to obtain a clear view before entering
a railroad crossing has resulted in nonsuit. The Court gives the reason
that "the doctrine of last clear chance does not apply where the con-
tributory negligence of the injured party bars recovery as a matter of
law."' 45 It would seem, however, that the real reason for not applying
"5 Moore v. A. C. L. R.R., 203 N. C. 275, 165 S. E. 708 (1932).
"Eller v. N. C. R.R., 200 N. C. 527, 157 S. E. 800 (1931).
1 Lee v. Southern Ry., 180 N. C. 413, 105 S. E. 15 (1920).
"8 Meacham v. Southern Ry., 213 N. C. 609, 197 S. E. 189 (1938) ; Dancy v.
A. C. L. R.R., 204 N. C. 303, 168 S. E. 200 (1933).
King v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 200 N. C. 398, 157 S. E. 28 (1931).
40 Collett v. Southern Ry., 198 N. C. 760, 153 S. E. 405 (1930).
Harper v. Norfolk & Western R.R., 230 N. C. 179, 52 S. E. 2d 717 (1949).
'o Rimmer v. Southern Ry., 208 N. C. 198, 179 S. E. 753 (1935).
"Hinnant v. A. C. L. R.R., 202 N. C. 489, 163 S. E. 555 (1932) ; Blair, Auto-
mobile Accidents at Railroad Crossings it; North Carolina, 23 N. C. L. REv. 223
(1945). On the subject of the duty of an automobile passenger generally, see
Note, 28 N. C. L. Ray. 302 (1950).
"George v. Atlantic & C. R.R., 207 N. C. 457, 177 S. E. 324 (1934). In
Jeffries v. Powell, 221 N. C. 415, 20 S. E. 2d 561 (1942), a nonsuit was granted
against the passenger when there was nothing to obstruct the view of the driver
past bushes 30 to 40 feet from the track.
"' Rimmer v. Southern Ry., 208 N. C. 198, 179 S. E. 753 (1935); Redmon v.
Southern Ry., 195 N. C. 764, 143 S. E. 829 (1928).
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the doctrine in these cases is that the engineer does not have oppor-
tunity to stop in time to prevent the collision after the plaintiff comes
from behind obstructions onto the track in front of the train.46
The present strict application of the rule that a traveler must, if
possible, get a clear view of a railroad track which he is crossing may
be a part of an increasing trend by the North Carolina Court to decide
contributory negligence cases as questions of law.47 At any rate, the
acceptance of this rule is now settled. The conflicting cases on its appli-
cation can probably be explained by the presence of modifying factors,
rather than by reason of any doubt as to its acceptance.
DiciKso McLEAN, JR.
Negotiable Instruments-Discharge of Prior Party by Statute
of Limitations--Effect on Guarantor and Surety
If the statute of limitations has run in favor of the maker of a
negotiable instrument, is a guarantor or surety on the instrument dis-
charged under Negotiable Instruments Law §120(3),1 which provides
that "A person secondarily liable on the instrument is discharged by the
discharge of a prior party ?" This question gives rise to two funda-
mental problems: first, is a surety or guarantor secondarily liable under
the Negotiable Instruments Law; second, does §120(3) include a dis-
charge of a prior party by the statute of limitations?
Negotiable Instruments Law §1922 stipulates that "The person pri-
marily liable on an instrument is the person who by the terms of the
instrument is absolutely required to pay the same. All other parties are
secondarily liable." Obviously, under this section, the liability of a
guarantor of collection is secondary, as it is dependent upon the creditor
pursuing the principal debtor with due diligence. Whether the liability
of a guarantor of payment is primary or secondary, however, is subject
to some dispute. One court has held that a guarantor of payment is
primarily liable, but only after the maturity of the note, since after
," The rule of "last clear chance" is applied in some cases in which the plaintiff
is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, as where he goes to sleep
on the tracks. Note, 16 N. C. L. Rav. 50 (1938). In Miller v. Southern Ry.,
205 N. C. 17, 169 S. E. 711 (1933), where the view was obstructed, the court said
the doctrine would not be applied because there was no evidence that the engineer
could have stopped after he discovered the driver was in a position of peril, and
this seems the better justification for refusing the application of the rule in this
situation.
," This trend may be reflected in the "insulation" of the railroad's negligence
by the driver's negligence depriving a passenger of his right to recover, and find-
ing contributory negligence as a matter of law where an automobile driver "out-
runs his headlights." Note, 27 N. C. L. REv. 153 (1948).
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. §25-127(3) (1943).2N. C. GEN. STAT. §25-2 (1943).
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maturity he is absolutely liable for the payment of the debt. 3 Appar-
ently, this result is reached by construing §192 to mean that any person
who is immediately obligated to pay the instrument is a primary party.
Thus, where a party's obligation is not dependent upon demand, pre-
sentment, and notice nor upon the creditor first suing the principal, his
liability has been said to be primary. 4  Conversely, other courts treat
the guarantor of payment as secondarily liable, even though he waives
demand, presentment, and notice.5 The reasoning used to reach this
result is that the liability of a guarantor is not predicated upon the
terms of the instrument, but upon the contract of guaranty, which is
treated as a separate and distinct contract.
Practically all courts which have passed on the matter have held the
surety to be primarily liable regardless of whether or not he indicates
his suretyship on the face of the instrument." In so holding, it is often
stated that the surety is bound by the terms of the instrument, and that
his liability is coextensive with that of the maker. This result seems
justified when the suretyship is not indicated on the face of the instru-
ment, for then the surety appears to be a person who by the terms of the
instrument is absolutely required to pay. However, when the suretyship
is indicated on the face of the instrument, it seems that a different
result should be reached. When the surety expresses his suretyship on
the face of the instrument, he qualifies his liability; and although the
creditor may immediately proceed against the surety, the relationship
between the two is significantly changed by this express manifestation.
Under the old doctrine of Pain v. Packard,7 for example, the surety
may give the creditor notice to sue the maker; and if suit is not
brought within a reasonable time, the surety is discharged to the extent
of his prejudice. This doctrine has been adopted by statute in many
states with some variations.8 Even in those states where no such rule
'Frost v. Harbert, 20 Idaho 336, 118 Pac. 1095 (1911) ; cf. Beebe v. Kirk-
patrick, 321 Il. 612, 152 N. E. 539 (1926) ; In re Menzer's Estate, 189 Wis. 340,
20 N. W. 703 (1926).
'Night & Day Bank v. Rosenbaum, 191 Mo. App. 559, 177 S. W. 393 (1915)
(accommodation indorser who waived demand, protest, and notice held primarily
liable).
'First Nat'l Bank of Shenandoah v. Drake, 185 Iowa 879, 171 N. W. 115
(1919) ; Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 86 N. H. 144, 164 Atl. 773 (1933)
Northern State Bank v. Bellamy, 19 N. D. 509, 125 N. W. 888 (1910).
'Hardesty v. Young, 34 F. 2d 310 (D. Minn. 1929) (suretyship indicated on
face of instrument); Vanderford v. Farmers & Mechanics Nat'l Bank, 105 Md.
164, 66 Atl. 47 (1907) (suretyship not indicated) ; Rouse v. Wooten, 140 N. C. 557,
53 S. E. 430 (1906) (not clear whether, suretyship indicated on face of instru-
ment); Cellars v. Meachem, 49 Ore. 186, 89 Pac. 426 (1907) (suretyship indi-
cated on face of instrument).
'13 Johns. 174 (N. Y. 1816).
8 Aiz. CODE ANN. §27-1701 (1939); Ky. REv. STAT. §412.110 (1948); Miss.




obtains, the surety, under certain circumstances, may bring an action
in equity to compel the creditor to proceed against the debtor before
resorting to the surety.9 Also, where property of both the principal
and the surety has been hypothecated, the surety can insist that the
principal's property be resorted to before that of the surety,1 ° and if
the surety and principal are sued jointly, then on execution the property
of the maker is to be exhausted before resorting to that of the surety.11
To say that the surety who indicates his suretyship on the face of the
instrument is by the terms of the instrument absolutely required to pay
the same ignores these qualifications of the absolute obligation to pay
which the existence of a suretyship carries with it. When the surety-
ship is indicated on the face of the instrument it seems a more logical
and equitable result would be reached by holding that the obligation to
pay has been expressly qualified. As stated by one court,' 2 "When a
party on signing clearly indicates upon the instrument the capacity in
which he is willing to be bound, the holder in accepting it cannot mis-
apprehend its true quality, for he then knows that the party may be
held in that capacity and no other." If the surety is not treated as a
secondary party, it seems he will be deprived of many of his common
law defenses. 13
'Bingham v. Mears, 4 N. D. 437, 61 N. W. 808 (1894). In Davis v. Patrick,
57 Fed. 909 (8th Cir. 1893) it is stated that where the surety is likely to sustain
loss by the delay and forbearance of the creditor, or where the creditor has access
to a fund for the payment of his debt which the sureties cannot make available,
a court of equity, at the instance of the surety, will coerce the creditor to pro-
ceed with the collection of his claim against the principal debtor.
10 Weil v. Thomas, 114 N. C. 197, 19 S. E. 103 (1894).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §26-2 (1943).
12 Northern State Bank v. Bellamy, 19 N. D. 509, 125 N. W. 888, 890 (1910).
The UNrFoRm COmiiERCIAL CODE §3-606(1) (Proposed Final Draft, Text and
Comments Ed., 1950), suggested by its drafters as a replacement of NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW §120, provides in part that "The holder discharges any party
to the instrument to the extent that without such party's consent the holder (a)
without express reservation of rights releases or agrees not to sue any person
against whom the party has to the knowledge of the holder a right of recourse
on the instrument, or agrees to suspend the right to enforce against such person
the instrument or collateral." In Comment 1 it is said "The words 'any party
to the instrument' remove an uncertainty arising under the original section. The
suretyship defenses here provided are not limited to parties who are 'secondarily
liable,' but are available to any party who is in the position of a surety, includ-
ing an accommodation maker or acceptor." And in Comment 4 it is stated "The
words 'to the knowledge of the holder' exclude the latent surety, as for example
the accommodation maker where there is nothing on the instrument to show that
he has signed for accommodation and the holder is ignorant of that fact. In such
a case the holder is entitled to proceed according to what is shown by the face
of the paper or what he otherwise knows, and does not discharge the surety when
he acts in ignorance of the relation."
" Negotiable Instruments Law §120 includes several defenses which were
available to the surety at the law merchant. Since §120 applies only to secondary
parties, it would seem that these, defenses would no longer be available to a
surety where he is treated as a primary party. However, in Prudential Insurance
Co. of America v. Bass, 357 Ill. 72, 191 N. E. 284 (1934) the court avoided this
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Even if the guarantor or surety be considered secondary parties, it
is still necessary to determine whether a discharge of a prior party by
the statute of limitations is sufficient to discharge secondary parties
under §120(3). 14 Before the Negotiable Instruments Law there was
some conflict as to what constituted such a discharge of a prior party
as would discharge a surety or guarantor. One view was that only a
discharge created by some affirmative act of the creditor was sufficient
to discharge secondary parties. 15 In contrast to this was the view that
a discharge initiated by some affirmative act or neglect of the holder was
sufficient.16
This conflict has not been settled by the Negotiable Instruments
Law. Professor Brewster, in his interpretation of §120(3), indicated
that it contemplates a discharge by the holder and not a discharge by
operation of law.' 7 On the other hand, Dean Ames contended' 8 ".... that
if the maker is discharged by the statute of limitations, all the indorsers
are ipso facto discharged." Most of the courts have adopted Professor
Brewster's view.19 Yet, there is at least one decision holding that a
guarantor of payment is discharged by the discharge of the maker by
the statute of limitations.2 0  Strong arguments can be advanced for the
result reached in the above case. Generally, the guarantor is permitted
to set up any defense which the maker of the note has against the holder,
and there is no reason why the statute of limitations should be an ex-
ception to this rule.21 The discharge of the debtor by the statute of
limitations, though not caused by some affirmative act of the holder, is
result by holding that the Negotiable Instruments Law did not apply to sureties
or guarantors and therefore the law merchant was resorted to in order to deter-
mine the rights of such parties. See, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW §196.
" Generally, the statute of limitations will discharge both the surety and the
maker at the same time; however, where the surety has been out of state long
enough to toll the statute as to him, this question is likely to arise. See, N. C.
GEN. STAT. §1-21 (1943).
" Nelson v. First Nat'l Bank, 69 Fed. 798 (8th Cir. 1895) ; Eickhoff v. Eiken-
bary, 52 Neb. 332, 72 N. W. 308 (1897); cf. Bull v. Coe, 77 Cal. 54, 18 Pac. 808
(1888).
( 8 Auchampaugh v. Schmidt, 70 Iowa 642, 27 N. W. 805 (1886); Shutts v.
Fingar, 100 N. Y. 539, 3 N. E. 588 (1885).
"' Brewster, A Defense of the Negotiable Instruments Law, 10 YALE L. J. 84,
94 (1901).
"
8 Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law, 14 HAIv. L. REv. 241, 253 (1900).
"9 Finance Corp. of New England v. Parker, 251 Mass. 372, 146 N. E. 696
(1925) (discharge of a prior indorser by statute of limitations did not discharge
subsequent indorsers) ; Romero v. Hopewell, 28 N. M. 259, 210 Pac. 231 (1922)
(discharge of a prior party by the statute of limitations did not discharge secondary
parties).
" First Nat'l Bank of Shenandoah v. Drake, 185 Iowa 879, 171 N. W. 115
(1919).
"1First Nat'l Bank of Shenandoah v. Drake, 185 Iowa 879, 171 N. W. 115
(1919); Auchampaugh v. Schmidt, 70 Iowa 642, 27 N. W. 805 (1886); Skoggs
v. Marcum, 247 Ky. 712, 57 S. W. 2d 670 (1933).
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due directly to the laches of the holder. 22 If the secondary party is
not discharged, the statute of limitations is circumvented; for the holder,
by collecting from the guarantor or surety, permits the surety or
guarantor to pursue the debtor.23  If the surety or guarantor is per-
mitted to take advantage of the debtor's defense, the diligent creditor
can still protect himself against the discharge of the surety or guarantor
due to the running of the statute -gainst the debtor, by obtaining a judg-
ment against the debtor prior to the running of the statute.
No definitive answer to all the questions raised herein is discernible
from the few North Carolina cases available. The court has held that
the liability of a guarantor of collection is conditional. 24 Thus it seems
that he will be considered a secondary party under the Negotiable
Instruments Law. Also, it has been held that a guaranty of payment
is an absolute promise to pay the debt.2 5  But this does not necessitate
the holding that a guarantor of payment is primarily liable, since it has
been stated by the court that a contract of guaranty is separate and
distinct from that of the debtor and that a guarantor's liability is not
the same as that of a surety.2 6 Further, it has been held that a surety
is primarily liable notwithstanding the fact that the suretyship was
expressed on the face of the instrument.2 7 There appear to be no North
Carolina cases indicating what kind of discharge is intended within the
meaning of §120(3).28
THOMAS M. MOORE.
2In Shutts v. Fingar, 100 N. Y. 539, 3 N. E. 588, 590 (1885) the court
remarks, "Where such consequences are produced by the direct action of the
creditor all authorities concur in holding that it constitutes a good defense to the
indorser, and it is difficult to see why the same consequences produced by the
deliberate laches and inaction of the creditor should not lead to the same result."
23 As a general rule the statute of limitations does not begin to run against the
surety until the time of payment by the surety, since the cause of action is not
upon the note itself but upon the implied promise of reimbursement arising from
the payment of the note. Blanchard v. Blanchard, 201 N. Y. 134, 94 N. E. 630
(1911) ; Bishoff v. Fehl, 345 Pa. 539, 29 AtI. 2d 58 (1942) ; Holland v. Tjosevig,
109 Wash. 142, 186 Pac. 317 (1919).
" Sykes v. Everett, 167 N. C. 600, 83 S. E. 585 (1914); Jones v. Ashford, 79
N. C. 172 (1878).
"Cowan v. Roberts, 134 N. C. 415, 46 S. E. 979 (1904) ; see Chemical Co. v.
Griffin, 202 N. C. 812, 813, 164 S. E. 577 (1932).
26 Coleman v. Fuller, 105 N. C. 328, 11 S. E. 175 (1890).
"
7Dry v. Reynolds, 205 N. C. 571, 172 S. E. 351 (1934). In Raleigh Banking
& Trust Co. v. York, 199 N. C. 624, 155 S. E. 263 (1930) and Horton v. Wilson,
175 N. C. 533, 95 S. E. 904 (1918) the surety was held primarily liable but the
suretyship was not expressed on the instrument. In Rouse v. Wooten, 140 N. C.
557, 53 S. E. 430 (1906) it is not clear whether or not the suretyship was ex-
pressed on the instrument. But see Roberson v. Spain, 173 N. C. 23, 25, 91 S. E.
361, 362 (1917) where the court remarks, "On the face of the notes the defendant
Bullock was primarily liable, and an extension of time to Spain would not release
him, in the absence of proof that he was a surety.
"See Carter v. Jones, 40 N. C. 196, 199 (1848) where the court recites the
proposition that mere delay by the creditor will not discharge the surety.
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Railroads-Misuse of Right of Way
Land acquired for a railroad right of way, whether by condemnation,
prescription, statutory presumption,' or by grant for railroad purposes
from the owner of the fee, 2 gives to the railroad only an easement in
such land.3  Unless there is an express grant of a fee title,4 the right of
way can be used for railroad purposes and no others. The same prin-
ciple is applicable to all public or quasi-public corporations which have
the power of eminent domain, i.e., the land can be used only for the
purposes for which it was taken. 5 The reasons for such a limitation are
twofold: (1) The right to acquire land by condemnation is based on
the presumption that the property so acquired will be used for the benefit
of the public. (2) A use for other purposes imposes an additional
burden upon the land for which the owner has not been compensated.
A railroad is not entitled to the exclusive use of the entire right of way,
and the owner of the fee is permitted to use so much of it as is not
actually required for railroad purposes.0 But the railroad may later
secure an injunction to have any obstruction removed when it is shown
that the use interferes with the operation of the railroad. 7
1 Several states have statutes which provide that if an action to recover com-
pensation for land taken for a railroad right of way is not brought within a fixed
period, the railroad is presumed to have acquired the land for railroad purposes.
N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-51 (1943) provides that no action for compensation for land
taken for a right of way by a railroad shall be brought unless commenced within
five years after the land has been entered, or within two years after the railroad
has started operations.
'For aid in distinguishing whether a deed to the railroad conveys a fee or
an easement, see Note, 132 A. L. R. 142 (1941).
'Grand Trunk R.R. v. Richardson, 91 U. S. 454 (1875); Norfolk So. R.R. v.
Strickland, 264 Fed. 546 (E. D. N. C. 1920); Hodges v. A. C. L. R.R., 196
N. C. 66, 144 S. E. 528 (1928); McCullock v. N. C. R.R., 146 N. C. 316, 59 S. E.
882 (1907); Seaboard A. L. Ry. v. Olive, 142 N. C. 257, 55 S. E. 263 (1906) ;
Raleigh and Augusta R.R. v. Sturgeon, 120 N. C. 225, 26 S. E. 797 (1896).
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §1253 (3d ed. 1939). See Notes, 94 A. L. R. 525
(1935); 149 A. L. R. 380 (1944).
'Both the statutes of the state and the charter of the railroad company must
be examined to ascertain if the company has power to acquire a fee title to land.
N. C. GEN. STAT. §60-37(3) (1943) provides that railroads may acquire land by
voluntary grant, but land so acquired may be used only for railroad purposes.
N. C. GEN. STAT. §60-37(4) (1943) allows railroads to acquire necessary land by
purchase with no qualifications as to use.
'This is the general rule unless there is a statute explicitly authorizing the
taking of the fee by condemnation. Hudson & M. R.R. v. Wendel, 193 N. Y.
166, 85 N. E. 1023 (1908) ; Neitzel v. Spokane International R.R., 65 Wash. 100,
117 Pac. 864 (1911). 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §1253 (3d ed. 1939); 2 LEwIs,
EMINENT DOMAIN §§449-451 (1900).
' Carolina & N. W. R.R. v. Piedmont Wagon and Mfg. Co., 229 N. C. 695,
51 S. E. 2d 301 (1949) ; A. C. L. R.R. v. Bunting, 168 N. C. 579, 84 S. E. 1009
(1915) ; Raleigh and Augusta R.R. v. Olive, 142 N. C. 257, 55 S. E. 263 (1906);
Shields v. Norfolk and Carolina R.R., 129 N. C. 1, 39 S. E. 582 (1901).
'Norfolk So. R.R. v. Strickland, 264 Fed. 546 (E. D. N. C. 1920); Carolina
& N. W. R.R. v. Piedmont Wagon and Mfg. Co., 229 N. C. 695, 51 S. E. 2d 301
(1949); Southern Ry. v. Lissenbee, 219 N. C. 318, 13 S. E. 2d 561 (1941);
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Several cases in which the use has been held proper have indicated
that the manner in which the right of way may be used is within the
sole discretion of the railroad,8 but a later decision makes it clear that
the use must be for railroad purposes only.9 It is generally recognized
that the railroad may license third persons to use the right of way in any
manner in which the railroad itself might use it.10 If the easement is
used primarily for railroad purposes, the fact that incidental benefits
flow to private parties does not constitute a misuse of the easement.
It is difficult to define a "railroad purpose" with any degree of
certainty, but in practically all instances a proper use will be for one
or several of the following purposes: (1) The operation and main-
tenance of the railroad. This includes passenger and freight depots,11
shanties for the railroad employees,' 2 telegraph lines,'3 and warning
signals.' 4  (2) Promotion of the enjoyment and convenience of the
passengers and employees. The maintenance of hotels,' 5 restaurants,',
and parks' 7 are proper if used primarily by passengers and employees.
(3) The erection of facilities for receiving, storing, and shipping
freight. This includes use for -a lumber yard,' s grain elevator,'2 or
warehouse 20 where shipment of material is directly from these points
rather than from the regular freight depots. The impracticality of re-
McCullock v. N. C. R.R., 146 N. C. 316, 59 S. E. 882 (1907) ; Raleigh and Augusta
R.R. v. Olive, 142 N. C. 257, 55 S. E. 263 (1906). N. C. GEN. STAT §1-44 (1943)
provides that a railroad cannot be barred from its right of way by the adverse
possession of another.
" Carolina & N. W. Ry. v. Piedmont Wagon & Mfg. Co., 229 N. C. 695, 51
S. E. 2d 301 (1949); Southern Ry. v. Lissenbee,'219 N. C. 318, 13 S. E. 2d 561
(1941); Hodges v. A. C. L. R1R., 196 N. C. 66, 144 S. E. 528 (1928) ; Coit v.
Owenby-Wofford Co., 166 N. C. 136, 81 S. E. 1067 (1914) ; Raleigh and Augusta
R.R. v. Olive, 142 N. C. 257, 55 S. E. 263 (1906).
Sparrow v. Dixie Leaf Tobacco Co., 232 N. C. 589, 61 S. E. 2d 700 (1950).
10 Grand Trunk R.R. v. Richardson, 91 U. S. 454 (1875) ; Mitchell v. Illinois
C. R.R., 384 Ill. 258, 51 N. E. 2d 271 (1943); Weir v. Standard Oil Co., 136
Miss. 205, 101 So. 290 (1924); Coit v. Owenby-Wofford Co., 166 N. C. 136, 81
S. E. 1067 (1914).
11Elyton Land Co. v. South & North Ala. R.R., 95 Ala. 631, 10 So. 270 (1891).
"Hodges v. A. C. L. Ry., 196 N. C. 66, 144 S. E. 528 (1928).
"Hodges v. Western Union Tel. Co., 133 N. C. 225, 45 S. E. 572 (1903).
The telegraph line was held to be a misuse of the easement because it was pri-
marily for commercial purposes, but the court stated that had the line been erected
primarily for use in operation of the railroad it would have been proper.1 Southern Ry. v. Lissenbee, 219 N. C. 318, 13 S. E. 2d 561 (1941).
", Abraham v. Oregon & C. R.R., 370 Ore. 495, 60 Pac. 899 (1900) (But not
proper if used primarily by the general public.).
Grudger v. Richmond and Danville R.R., 106 N. C. 481, 11 S. E. 515 (1889).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §60-37(12) (1943) provides that a railroad may operate hotels
and restaurants along its right of way for the convenience of the traveling public.
" Louisville Property Co. v. Commonwealth, 146 Ky. 827, 143 S. W. 412(1Grand Truck R.R. v. Richardson, 91 U. S. 454 (1875).
1" Illinois Central R.R. v. Wathen, 17 Ill. App. 582 (1857).
"0 Anderson v. Interstate Mfg. Co., 152 Iowa 455, 132 N. W. 812 (1911) ; Coit
v. Owenby-Wofford Co., 166 N. C. 136, 81 S. E. 1067 (1914).
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quiring railroads to receive and ship all freight from its regular terminals
is apparent, and such a use seems justified. The use of these facilities,
however, should be of a substantial nature. A use of the easement
where gasoline was received for sales by a filling station was a mis-
use,21 whereas a use for bulk oil storage for distribution to retail dealers
was help proper.22  (4) Lease of the right of way to private parties to
secure their freight business. Several courts have stated that such a
use is for a railroad purpose, particularly where the lease provides that
the lessee give preference in shipment of freight to the railroads.
2 3  It
should be noted, however, that in practically all cases where a lease of
the right of way to procure business has been held proper, facilities for
receiving and shipping freight have existed upon the leased property and
have been a prime factor in determining the propriety of the use.
In a recent case, the defendant tobacco company leased from a rail-
road for a nominal rent a portion of its right of way upon which the
tobacco company erected two warehouses. The lease contained no pro-
vision compelling the tobacco company to ship over the railroad, but
the company did so in all but a few instances. A spur track had orig-
inally been extended to the warehouses to facilitate shipment, but it was
removed prior to this action. The tobacco company thereafter shipped
all its freight from the regular freight depot. The owner of the fee,
subject to the railroad right of way, was allowed to recover the land
upon which the warehouses were located in an action of ejectment on
the ground that the leased property was not being used for railroad
purposes.24
Due to the absence of any shipping facilities on the right of way,
the decision appears to be in accordance with authority. The court
emphasized the lack of an express provision to ship over the railroad,
but under the circumstances, such a provision appears unnecessary.2
That the rent was nominal and that the tobacco company shipped almost
21 hn re Chicago & N. W. R.R., 127 F. 2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1942).
22 Mitchell v. Illinois C. R.R., 384 Ill. 258, 51 N. E. 2d 271 (1943); Weir v.
Standard Oil Co., 136 Miss. 205, 101 So. 290 (1924).
"Anderson v. Interstate Mfg. Co., 152 Iowa 455, 132 N. W. 812 (1911)
(shipping a part of its goods over a competitor railroad not sufficient to work a
forfetiture) ; Griswold v. Ill. C. R.R., 90 Iowa 265, 57 N. W. 843 (1894) ; City
of Detroit v. C. H. Little Co., 146 Mich. 384, 109 N. W. 671 (1906) ; Hall v.
Bowers, 117 Neb. 619, 222 N. W. 40 (1928) (use of right of way to drive cattle
to shipping terminal); Coit v. Owenby-Wofford Co., 166 N. C. 136, 81 S. E. 1067
(1914).
2S Sparrow v. Dixie Leaf Tobacco Co., 232 N. C. 589, 61 S. E. 2d 700 (1950).
2 The lack of a provision to give the railroad preference in shipment was the
principal distinction made between the present case and a previous case in which
the use of a right of way for a wholesale grocery warehouse was held proper.
However, the decision there rested primarily on the fact that the use of the land
was to facilitate shipment over the railroad. Coit v. Owenby-Wofford Co., 166
N. C. 136, 81 S. E. 1067 (1914), 28 HARv. L. Rrv. 208 (1914).
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exclusively over the lessor railroad dearly indicate that the procure-
ment of business was the real consideration for the execution of the
lease. In the absence of shipping facilities, it is questionable if a lease
of a portion of the right of way solely to promote business would be
held proper, even where there is a provision to give the railroad pref-
erence in shipping.26
Where there is a misuse of the easement, several remedies are avail-
able to the owner of the fee. If the railroad abandons operation of the
road altogether, it has forfeited all rights to the easement, and the owner
may reenter the land.2 7  But when the railroad continues in operation,
and only a portion of the right of way has been subjected to a misuse,
the owner of the fee may obtain an injunction to prevent further mis-
use,28 or bring an action for damages against the party so misusing the
land,29 or, as in the principal case, bring ejectment for recovery of that
portion of the easement so misused.30 Where the additional burden
placed upon the land is itself for a public purpose, damages are as a
general rule the only remedy available.2 ' If permanent damages are
recovered, the effect is to give an easement to the party paying the
damages.3 2  It should be noted that an action for damages in such cases
20 "The fact that a business receives its goods by rail is not a conclusive de-
termination that the use of easement land by the business is a proper one and not
a burden." Io re Chicago & N. W. R.R., 127 F. 2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1942) ; Bond
v. Tex. & P. R.R., 181 La. 763, 160 So. 406 (1935) ; Proprietors of the Locks and
Canals v. Nashua & L. R.R., 104 Mass. 1 (1870).
-7 Norton v. Duluth Transfer R.R., 129 Minn. 126, 151 N. W. 907 (1915).
4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §1256 (3d ed. 1939). But where buildings and other
improvements are placed upon the right of way for the operation of the railroad,
they may be removed in the same manner as personal property. Western N. C.
R.R. v. Deal, 90 N. C. 110 (1884).
2" Hodges v. A. C. L. Ry., 196 N. C. 66, 144 S. S. 528 (1928). Note, 7
N. C. L. Rav. 197 (1929) (Injunction was refused, but the court states that
injunction was the proper remedy had there been a misuse of the right of way.) ;
Hales v. A. C. L. Ry., 172 N. C. 104, 90 S. E. 11 (1916) ; Ragsdale v. Southern
Ry. Co., 60 S. C. 381, 38 S. E. 609 (1901).
28 McCullock v. N. C. R.R., 146 N. C. 316, 59 S. E. 882 (1907); Beasley v.
Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R., 145 N. C. 272, 59 S. E. 60 (1907) ; Hodges v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 133 N. C. 225, 45 S. E. 572 (1903).
20 Mitchell v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 384 I1. 258, 51 N. E. 2d 271 (1943) ; Neitzel
v. Spokane International R.R., 65 Wash. 100, 117 Pac. 864 (1911).
" In McCullock v. N. C. R.R., 146 N. C. 316, 59 S. E. 882 (1907) the railroad
leased its right of way to a larger line, which used it to a much greater extent.
The holder of the fee sought ejectment because of the additional burden, but was
awarded damages, the measure being the difference in the extent which the lessor
road would have used the land and the extent which the larger railroad did use
the land. Hodges v. Western Union Tel. Co., 133 N. C. 225, 45 S. E. 572 (1903).
But several cases have held that even where the misuse was not for other public
purposes, there could be no ejectment. Proprietors of the Locks and Canals v.
Nashua & L. R.R., 104 Mass. 1 (1870) (mesne profits recovered); Lyon v.
McDonald, 78 Tex. 71, 14 S. W. 261 (1890) (reasonable rental value recovered).
" McCullock v. N. C. R.R., 146 N. C. 316, 59 S. E. 882 (1907) ; Phillips v.
Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 130 N. C. 513, 41 S. E. 1022 (1902).
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is subject to the three-year statute of limitations,3 3 whereas ejectment
is apparently available for at least twenty years from the date of entry.
3 4
Although the remedies available to the owner of the fee in case of a
misuse of a right of way may appear to be in the nature of a windfall,
the inherent right of a landowner to have land which is taken for the
public use restricted to that use seems to justify his right to relief.
S. DEAN HAMRICK.
Restraint of Trade-Requirements Contracts-Violation
of North Carolina Anti-Trust Statute
A North Carolina anti-trust statute' makes it unlawful for any per-
son to make a sale, or to contract to make a sale "of any goods . . . in
North Carolina, whether directly or indirectly . . . upon the condition
that the purchaser thereof shall not deal in the goods . . . of a com-
petitor or rival in the business of the person ... making such sales."
In Grubb Oil Co. v. Garner,2 the court held that a filling station
lessor's covenant not to sell any petroleum products other than those
of the lessee from the demised premises or from any other premises
within a radius of two thousand feet constituted a "permissible restric-
tion in a lease rather than a forbidden condition in a sales contract."8
The court said the lessor apparently had no right to sell or deal with
anything on the premises while under demise but, however this might
be,4 there was no allegation that the lessor agreed to purchase petroleum
products from anyone---"a necessary averment to attract the provisions
*IN. C. GEN. STAT. §1-52(3) (1943) provides that when there is a continuing
trespass upon real property, the action shall be commenced within three years from
the original trespass, and not thereafter. Teeter v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co.,
172 N. C. 783, 90 S. E. 941 (1916).
" Sparrow v. Dixie Leaf Tobacco Co., 232 N. C. 589, 61 S. E. 2d 700 (1950).
2 N. C. GEr. STAT. §75-5 (1943): "In addition to the matters and things
hereinbefore declared to be illegal, the following acts are declared to be unlaw-
ful, that is, for any person, firm, corporation, or association directly or indirectly
to do or to have any contract, express or knowingly implied, to do any of the acts
or things specified in any of the subsections of this section. (2) To make a sale
.of any goods, wares, merchandise, articles or things of value whatsoever in North
Carolina, whether directly or indirectly, or through any agent or employee, upon
the condition that the purchaser thereof shall not deal in the goods, wares, merchan-
dise, articles or things of value of a competitor or rival in the business of the
person, firm, corporation or association making such sales." For the original
enactment of the North Carolina statute to this effect see N. C. Pub. Laws 1907,
c. 218, §1 (a).
2230 N. C. 499, 53 S. E. 2d 441 (1949).
3 Id. at 501, 53 S. E. 2d at 443.
'Because of confusion in pleading it did not clearly appear by what arrange-
ment the lessor was in possession of the premises. Although a lease-sublease
arrangement was referred to, it was not properly alleged and therefore not con-
sidered by the court. Id. at 501, 53 S. E. 2d at 442.
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of" the statute set out above. However, by way of dictum the court
added, "of course, if it should appear ... that the demise of the prem-
ises to the lessee and its immediate subletting to the lessor, for purposes
of operation, were but parts of a single transaction, though separately
stated, a different situation might arise.....-6
Such a situation was presented to the court in the recent case of
Arey v. Lemons.7  There the parties executed a single instrument
whereby the owners of lands leased to an oil company rent free, and
the oil company subleased the property back to the owner for the same
term rent free, upon the agreement that the owners operate a filling
station thereon for the duration of the lease and that only the petroleum
products of the oil company be sold at the station. The court held the
instrument void. It said that the only consideration, if any, to support
the provisions of the writing was the mutual promises of the parties,
and that "any condsideration inherent in these mutual promises is neces-
sarily illegal; for the agreement has as its object the violation of ' 8 the
anti-trust statute.
In only two decisions9 prior to the Arey case has the court found
such a violation. In each instance a contract of sale of merchandise for
resale by the buyer which provided that the buyer would not sell or
permit to be sold on his premises similar merchandise of competitors
was held illegal.
The court refused to apply the statute in Lewis v. Archbell'° where
it did not clearly appear that the sale was "upon the condition" that
the purchaser was not to buy from a competitor. The court stressed
the fact that a seller would have the right to contract to sell his entire
output to any single purchaser, and that such purchaser would have the
right to purchase from only one seller if he chose, pointing out the
fact that the statute condemns the contract of sale only if the sale is
made on the prohibited condition. In Mar-Hof v. Rosenbacker," the
court distinguished between requirements contracts and contracts of
exclusive representation, holding in effect that while the statute forbids
the buyer to contract exclusively with the seller, this prohibition does
not extend to contracts in which the seller binds himself to sell ex-
clusively to the buyer.
In spite of the fact that these earlier cases dealt only with contracts
Id. at 500, 53 S. E. 2d at 442.0 Id. at 501, 53 S. E. 2d at 443.
7232 N. C. 531, 61 S. E. 2d 596 (1950).8 d. at 536, 61 S. E. 2d at 600.
'Florsbeim Shoe Co. v. Leader Dept. Store, 212 N. C. 75, 193 S. E. 9 (1937);
Standard Fashion Co. v. Grant, 165 N. C. 463, 81 S. E. 606 (1914).10 199 N. C. 205, 154 S. E. 11 (1930).
11 176 N. C. 330, 97 S. E. 169 (1918).
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of sale, the court by its dictum in the Grubb case, had clearly indicated
that it would extend the application to lease-sublease arrangements;
and although in the Arey case, there was talk of the absence, or illegal-
ity, of consideration to support the provisions of the lease, the opinion
also states that the statute would apply even where such leases are
founded on legal consideration.Y
2
As a practical matter this type of lease-sublease arrangement is
nothing more than a requirements contract. Thus if the statute out-
lawing requirements contracts is actually beneficial, it seems that the
court is justified in extending its application to other arrangements by
which the same result is effected. Such an extension seems to be in
line with the view taken by the United States Supreme Court in the
recent case of Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States.13 There,
in construing Section 3 of the Clayton Act1 4 which prohibits require-
ments contracts, but only in the event that their effect "may be to sub-
stantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly," the court
declared these contracts illegal if used by a defendant-seller doing a
quantitatively substantial volume of business.'0
Although this decision may be justified it is generally agreed that
requirements contracts may well be of economic advantage to buyers as
well as to sellers. 16 Probably the principal objective inducing a buyer
to enter into such a contract is the desire to obtain an assured, reliable
source of supply and thereby relieve himself of the expense and risk
of storage in the quantity necessary for a commodity having a fluctuating
demand. Requirements contracts benefit the seller in that they assure
him of an exclusive outlet in so far as the particular retailer is con-
cerned. At the same time they effectively limit the field in which he
must meet the competition of his rivals, thereby enabling him to reduce
12 Arey v. Lemons, 232 N. C. 531, 536, 61 S. E. 2d 596, 600 (1950).
13 337 U. S. 293 (1949).
1438 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §14 (1946). This section declares, inter
alia, that "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods . . . on
the condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof
shall not use or deal in the goods . . . of a competitor . . . of the lessor or
seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale ...may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce."
1' Prior to this decision nothing less than the inference of a substantial lessen-
ing of competition, arising out of the employment of such contracts by companies
dominant in their industry would satisfy the requirement of section 3 of the
Clayton Act. Fashion Originators Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 312 U. S. 457 (1940); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258
U. S. 346 (1922). For a brief discussion of requirements contracts under section
3 of the Clayton Act see Note, 28 N. C. L. Ray. 188 (1950).
16 Stockhausen, The Commercial and Anti-Trust Aspects of Term Requiremnents
Contracts, 23 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 412 (1948).
(Vol. 29
NOTES AND COMMENTS
selling expenses to a minimum. To the newcomer in the field, such
contracts offer the possibility of a predictable market on the basis of
which he may estimate what capital expenditures are necessary. Still
more important to the newcomer is the opportunity these contracts may
provide to establish a foothold against the counter-attacks of entrenched
competitors. However, requirements contracts deny retailers the oppor-
tunity to deal in the products of competing suppliers. Since these sup-
pliers are excluded from access to the outlets subject to such contracts,
the new supplier may find himself foreclosed from any substantial market.
Whatever the commercial merits and demerits of the contract in-
volved, the North Carolina statute in making requirements contracts
illegal, per se, precludes any rule of reason which might otherwise be
applied. The statute leaves no room for evidence as to a defendant's
competitive position in the industry nor for testimony as to commercial
justification of the contract in the particular case. While such a situation
may seem undesirable, it must be remembered that the test of reason-
ableness places a tremendous burden on the courts to interpret com-
plicated economic data-an undertaking for which courts are not
particularly well suited.17
If all lease-sublease arrangements are held within the purview of
the statute, suppliers might turn to the use of ordinary long-term con-
tracts in which the purchaser agrees to buy a denominated amount of
goods rather than his specific requirements.' 8 Or, the supplier might
simply refuse to deal with any retailer who has not shown a willingness
to deal exclusively in the supplier's product.
On the other hand, there is a strong possibility that in so far as
oil companies are concerned, prohibition of the lease-sublease arrange-
ment would force them to resort to agency arrangements or to the out-
right acquisition of filling stations, either of which means increasing
control over the retail field and forcing the independent owner to ex-
change his status for that of employee. Regardless of the possible con-
sequences, this most recent decision on the point by the North Carolina
court indicates that such lease-sublease contracts will be held illegal.
JOsEPH F. BOWEN, JR.
Taxation-Alimony Payments-State and Federal Income
Tax Consequences
No attorney can properly settle a separation or divorce case involv-
ing alimony or payments under a separation agreement, without con-
17 See Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States, 337 U. S. 293, 310 (1949).
s Some courts find this method less objectionable than requirements contracts.
Ibid.
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sidering the income tax consequences. This necessarily entails close
scrutiny of both state and federal statutes.
The North Carolina income tax statutes provide that effective Jan-
uary 1, 1949, payments for the separate support and maintenance of a
divorced or estranged spouse, who is living apart from the spouse mak-
ing such payments, will be an allowable deduction. The payment may
be made pursuant to a court order or under terms of a written or oral
agreement of the parties. The deduction is limited, however, to the
amount of the payment or one thousand dollars, whichever is smaller.
Where payments are made to more than one spouse, then a similar
limited deduction may be taken for each spouse. Support payments to
a dependent or to a spouse for a dependent cannot be included in this
deduction.1 It appears that alimony or separation payments received
are not taxable as income.2  Since the state statute is applicable to all
types of alimony payments, problems seldom arise in this area.
The Revenue Act of 1942 completely revised the federal tax treat-
ment of alimony.3 This changed the earlier rule under Gould v. Gotld4
that alimony was not taxable income to the wife nor deductible by the
husband. An examination of the legislative history of the alimony sec-
tions reveals that Congress hoped to achieve a uniform treatment of
amounts paid in the nature of or in lieu of alimony regardless of vari-
ance in the laws of the several states.5
With one exception, Section 23(u) of the Internal Revenue Code
provides if a payment is includible in the income of the wife under
Section 23(k) it is deductible from adjusted gross income of the hus-
band.6 Also where the husband is allowed a deduction, a fortiori, it is
taxable income to the wife. However, in order for the payments to be
deductible by the husband and taxable as income to the wife, they must
meet the conditions of Section 22(k) and 23(u) of the Code. These
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-147(14) (Supp. 1949); P-H N. C. INc. TAX SERV.
110,750 (1950).2 P-H N. C. INc. TAX SERv. 110,485 (1950). Administrative boards have
recommended to the present legislature that alimony payments be returned for tax-
ation in the same amount as they are allowed for deductions.
2 See generally, Kramer, Alimony and the Tax Law, 26 TAXES 1105 (1948)
Starr, Alimony as an Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAXES 975 (1949); Wall, Ali-
mony and the Income Tax, 3 MIAMI L. REv. 564 (1949); 34 MINN. L. REv. 280(1950).
'245 U. S. 151 (1917).
'H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1942); SEN. REP. No. 1631,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1943); Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N. C. 129, 37 S. E. 2d
118 (1946) ("Alimony ... is an allowance made for the support of the wife out
of the estate of the husband by order of court in an appropriate proceeding and
is either temporary or permanent.") ; KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE. §560 (3rd
ed. 1946) (It is that obligation for support which arises in favor of the wife
upon the disruption of the marriage relation.).




statutory conditions will be examined in the light of the law of alimony
in North Carolina.
(1) The parties must be divorced or legally separated under a decree
of divorce or of separate maintenance.7 If the wife applies for divorce
from bed and board, divorce a vinculo, or alimony without divorce,
alimony pendente lite is provided for by statute in North Carolina.8
Alimony payments pendente lite, however, are not deductible by the
husband nor taxable to the wife because ordered prior to rather than
pursuant to a decree by the court.9
An alimony without divorce decree, as provided for in North Caro-
lina, seems to be neither a decree of legal separation nor a decree of
divorce ;1o therefore, payments made pursuant to a decree of alimony
without divorce are not deductible under Section 23(u) nor taxable
under Section 22(k).11
Since in North Carolina a divorce a vinculo cannot provide for
permanent alimony, ordinarily no tax problem arises.12 If, however, a
decree of absolute divorce is obtained upon the grounds of two years
separation, as provided for in N. C. GEN. STAT. §50-5 or §50-6, such
decree does not destroy the right of the wife to receive alimony under
7 IxT. REv. CODE §22(k) : "In the case of a wife who is divorced or legally
separated from her husband under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance-
periodic payments (whether or not made at regular intervals) received subsequent
to such decree in discharge of, or attributable to property transferred (in trust
or otherwise) in discharge of, a legal obligation which, because of the marital
or family relationship, is imposed upon or incurred by such husband under such
decree or under a written separation instrument incident to such divorce or separa-
tion shall be includible in the gross income of such wife, and such amounts re-
ceived as are attributable to property so transferred shall not be includible in the
gross income of such husband. . .. " INT. REv. CODE §23 (u) provides for a
deduction "In the case of a husband described in section 22(k), amounts includible
under section 22(k), in the gross income of his wife, payment of which is made
within the husband's taxable year. If the amount of any such payment is, under
section 22(k) or section 171, stated to be not includible in such husband's gross
income, no deduction shall be allowed with respect to such payment under this
subsection."
8 N. C. GEN. STAT. §50-15 (1943) (a zinculo and a inensa actions); N. C.
GEN. STAT. §50-16 (1943) (alimony without divorce actions) ; Peele v. Peele, 216
N. C. 298, 4 S. E. 2d 616 (1939); Medlin v. Medlin, 175 N. C. 529, 95 S. E.
857 (1918) (a vincudo action by husband, court allowed alimony pendente lite to
wife).
IGeorge D. Wick, 7 T. C. 723 (1946),.aff'd, 161 F. 2d 732 (3rd Cir. 1947).
The Pennsylvania statute providing for alimony pendente lite, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23 §46 (1930) as amended (1933), is very similar to N. C. GEN. STAT. §50-15
(1943). See U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(k)-l(a) (1948).
10 N. C. GEN. STAT. §50-16 (1943) provides for a decree if the husband deserts
and fails to provide, or is a drunkard or spendthrift (which would not seem to
call necessarily for separate living), or gives cause for divorce, absolute or lim-
ited). See, Shore v. Shore, 220 N. C. 802, 804, 18 S. E. 2d 353, 354 (1942) (the
statute is one solely for support).
"' Frank J. Kalchthaler, 7 T. C. 625 (1946) (status under Pennsylvania law
was that he was living apart from his wife, but not legally separated).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §50-11 (1943), Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N. C. 129, 37 S. E.
118 (1946).
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any judgment or decree of the court rendered before the commencement
of the proceeding for absolute divorce 13 This exception seems to in-
clude awards under an a mensa divorce, 14 alimony without divorce
awards, 15 and separation agreements,'0 entered into prior to the divorce
a vincido. As noted above, alimony without divorce awards are not
considered taxable under Section 22(k) because the parties have neither
a legal separation nor a divorce. 17 On the other hand, if a prior ali-
mony without divorce decree is incorporated into, or is referred to in
the a vinculo divorce decree, it would seem to meet the requirement that
the provision for payment be made in the divorce decree or by a written
instrument incident to the divorce or separation. Further, separation
agreements entered into prior to a decree of absolute divorce are not
invalidated by a divorce a Vinculo.' 8  Thus, if the separation agreement
is prepared with the understanding that the parties will be legally
separated under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance, then
the payments received after the divorce a vinculo are taxable to the
wife.19
On divorce from bed and board in North Carolina, the court may
decree alimony to the wife.20 Alimony paid pursuant to a decree of
divorce from bed and board is deductible by the husband,2' and such
decree may be modified at a later date. 22 But if an agreement is entered
into after the divorce, increasing the payments, the increase will not be
deductible unless the new agreement is incorporated into the decree.23
The agreement would not be "incident to the divorce" unless so incor-
porated. The same grounds which entitle the wife to a divorce a 1nensa
entitle the wife to separate maintenance. 24 Therefore, it may be to her
financial advantage to refuse to obtain a divorce a mnensa, payments
13 N. C. GEN. STAT. §50-11 (1943), Simmons v. Simmons, 223 N. C. 841,
28 S. E. 2d 489 (1944) (alimony without divorce) ; Dyer v. Dyer, 212 N. C. 620,
194 S. E. 278 (1937) (action for subsistence).
"
4See, Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N. C. 129, 134, 37 S. E. 2d 118, 121 (1946) (a
prior award of alimony is protected from annulment by a decree in absolute
divorce).
" Simmons v. Simmons, 223 N. C. 841, 28 S. E. 2d 439 (1944).1 Jenkins v. Jenkins, 225 N. C. 681, 36 S. E. 2d 233 (1945); Lentz v. Lentz,
193 N. C. 742, 138 S. E. 12 (1927) (consent judgment not affected by a subse-
quent absolute divorce).
"* See note 11, stepra.
"
8Jenkins v. Jenkins, 225 N. C. 681, 36 S. E. 2d 233 (1945) ; Lentz v. Lentz,
193 N. C. 742, 138 S. E. 12 (1927).
" Tuckee G. Hesse, 7 T. C. 700 (1946) (Pennsylvania divorce a vinculo
statute involved, and similar to N. C. GEN. STAT. §50-11 (1943)).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §50-14 (1943), Silver v. Silver, 220 N. C. 191, 16 S. E. 2d
834 (1941).
"Accord, George D. Wick, 7 T. C. 723, 728 (1946), aff'd, 161 F. 2d 732(3d Cir. 1947).
" Crews v. Crews, 175 N. C. 168, 95 S. E. 149 (1918).
"Natalia Danesi Murray, P-H 1948 TC MEm. DEC. 48,097 (1948).
"N. C. GEN. STAT. §50-16 (1943).
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under it being taxable, and receive tax free alimony under a separate
maintenance award.
(2) The provision for payment of alimony must be made specific-
ally by the divorce decree or by a written instrument incident to the
divorce or separation 5 When the provision for payment is expressly
set out in the decree of divorce, there is no problem. Most of the
cases under this section involve the problem of whether the separation
agreement is incident to the divorce or separation. If a separation agree-
ment meets certain requirements, it will be enforced' in North Caro-
lina .2  Unless the separation agreement is entered into with a future
divorce or legal separation in mind, however, payments received after
the divorce are not taxable to the wife under Section 22(k) as not
incident to the divorce.27  A formal agreement of separation providing
for payments, drafted after a decree of divorce a vinculo or a mensa,
reducing to writing an oral agreement entered into prior to the decree,
is not an agreement incident to the divorce. 28  If the agreement refers
to an impending divorce, it might be construed as facilitating the divorce
and will not be enforced. 29  Recognizing this, the Tax Court has held
that to be incident to the divorce or legal separation, the agreement
itself does not have to refer to the divorce or separation because the
whole record will be considered30 Even payments made by taxpayer-
" INT. REv. CODE §22(k) ; Charles Campbell, 15 T. C. (No. 52) (1950) (letter
written by husband stating he would pay a certain amount monthly to his wife
if she obtained a divorce met the requirement of a written instrument).
"Archbell v. Archbell, 158 N. C. 408, 74 S. E. 327 (1912) (requisites of
separation agreement: (1) there must be a separation already existing or imme-
diately to follow the execution of the deed; (2) the separation deed must be
made for an adequate reason, of such kind that it is necessary for the health or
happiness of one or the other; (3) it must be reasonable and fair to the wife,
considering the condition of the parties) ; N. C. GEN. STAr. §52-12 (Supp. 1947)
(statutory requirements of valid agreement).
" Charles G. Brown, P-H 1949 TC MEm. DEc. 149,195 (1949) (agreement
in form of support of wife and children under Pennsylvania law rather than for
alimony) ; Benjamin B. Cox, 10 T. C. 955 (1948), aff'd, 176 F. 2d 226 (3rd Cir.
1949) (support agreement seven months after divorce not incident to divorce);
Frederick S. Dauwalter, 9 T. C. 580 (1947) (after divorce decree entered, agreed
with wife to increase alimony; held not deductible because husband's compliance
with the request was gratuitous and without compulsion of any legal obligation
arising out of a marital relationship imposed on him under a written instrument
incident to such divorce).
"'Frederick S. Dauwalter, 9 T. C. 580 (1947); U. S. Treas. Reg. 111
§29.22(k)-i (1948) (Example (3): H and W enter into antenuptial agreement
in which H agrees to pay wife $200 a month for life for release of all dower
rights. A divorce is later obtained, but silent as to such agreement and I's
obligation to support W. Section 22(k) does not apply. But if the decree is
modified to refer to the agreement, or if at time of the divorce, reference had
been made to the agreement in the court's decree or in a written instrument inci-
dent to the divorce, Section 22(k) would require the inclusion in the income of
the wife).
" Archbell v. Archbell, 158 N. C. 408, 74 S. E. 327 (1912).
o Estate of Daniel G. Reid, 15 T. C. (No. 78) (1950) ; Robert Wood John-
son, 10 T. C. 647 (1948).
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husband -to his estranged wife under orders of a New York court, in
an attempt to enforce a voluntary separation agreement, were disallowed
as a deduction because there was no "decree" as required by Section
22(k).3 1
(3) The alimony payments must be periodic.3 2 Periodic payments
normally state the amount to be paid each period, but neither the total
period nor the total amount; whereas lump sum payments generally set
forth the total amount that is to be paid. In general, installment pay-
ments discharging a part of an obligation, the principal sum of which
is specified in the decree of divorce or legal separation or an instru-
ment incident thereto, are not considered periodic payments and are
therefore not includible in the wife's gross income under Section 22(k).
Installment payments under a lump sum award or agreement may be
deductible if the lump sum, by the terms of the decree or written instru-
ment thereto, may be or is to be paid within a period ending more than
ten years from the date of the decree or instrument. In such cases, the
installment payment is considered periodic payment but only to the
extent that such installment payments received during the wife's tax-
able year do not exceed ten percent of the principal sum.3 3  The ten
year period commences with the date the legal obligation to make
the payments in question was imposed on the husband for the first
time.34 If the payments are contingent on earnings, the payments are
considered periodic even though to be paid for a specific number of
months.3 5
(4) The payments must be made solely in settlement of the legal
obligation imposed on the husband because of the marital relationship.
In Frank J. Dubane v. Comm'r.,36 the parties orally agreed for alimony
payments of twenty dollars a week, but the subsequent written agree-
ment was so phrased that it indicated that the twenty dollar payments
were for property that the wife had previously transferred to the hus-
band. The written agreement controlled, and the payments under it
were held not to be made solely in discharge of alimony and conse-
quently non-deductible.
"Alfred Terrell, P-H 1948 TC MEm. DEC. 48,169 (1948), aff'd, 179 F. 2d
838 (7th Cir. 1950).
"Frank R. Casey, 12 T. C. 224 (1949) (payments in sum of $100 per month
for fifty months not periodic) ; J. B. Steinel, 10 T. C. 409 (1948) (sum of $100
per month until the sum of $9,500 is paid not periodic) ; INT. REV. CODE §22(k)
(though required to be periodic, the payments need not be regular).
U. S. Treas. Reg. 111 §29-22(k)-i (c) (1948).
Tillie Blum, 10 T. C. 1131 (1948).
"Roland Keith Young, 10 T. C. 724 (1948) (fixed period of 50 months, but
amount contingent on earnings held periodic.)
36 10 T. C. 992, 995 (1948) ("The result might be different had Congress chosen
to recognize oral agreements or had the petitioner put his oral agreement in writ-
ing in a forthright manner.").
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Many awards of alimony contain provisions for support of minor
children. If a portion of a periodic payment is specifically designated
for support of minor children, such portion is neither deductible by the
husband nor taxable to the wife.8 7 If the decree or separation agree-
ment fails to earmark part of the periodic payment as support of the
minor children, the total amount will be taxed to the wife irrespective
of how the money was expended.3 The whole decree or agreement will
be examined to see if it furnishes by implication a basis for determining
whether a portion is for the childrens' support.39 If any periodic pay-
ment is less than the amount provided in a decree or written instrument
which specified an amount for minor children's support, Section 22(k)
provides that the amount paid will be considered first as a payment for
support of the minor children and only the remainder is to be included
as income of the wife.4 0
When a legal obligation to support a divorced or estranged spouse,
living separate from his or her spouse, is satisfied by the transfer of
property or payment of a lump sum, under the North Carolina law, the
amount of such lump sum payment or the market value of the property
at the time of conveyance, or one thousand dollars, whichever is smaller,
may be taken as a deduction.41  Under federal provisions, the rental
value of real estate transferred in lieu of alimony is not deductible by
the husband because it was never included in the husband's gross
income.
42
Section 22(k) provides that periodic payments received by the wife
are includible in her income in the year received, regardless of what
system of accounting she normally uses.4 3 For the corresponding deduc-
tion, the husband is treated as if he makes his income tax return on the
cash receipt and disbursement basis. 44 Under North Carolina statutes,45
any individual who reports his income on an accrual basis may claim the
"¢U. S. Treas. Reg. 111 §29.22(k)-l(d) (1948).
"Dora H. Moitoret, 7 T. C. 640 (1946).
"Warren Leslie, Jr., 10 T. C. 807 (1948).
40U. S. Treas. Reg. 111 §29.22(k)-l (d) (1948). For example, if the husband
is required by terms of the decree to pay $200 a month to his divorced wife, $100
of which is designated by the decree to be for the support of their minor children,
and the husband pays only $150 to his wife, $100 is nevertheless considered to be
a payment by the husband for the support of the children.
4"N. C. Gmq. STAT. §105-147(14) (Supp. 1949); N. C. GEx. STAT. §50-17
(1943) (provision for writ of possession in all cases where the court grants
alimony by the assignment of real estate).
"Pappenheimer v. Allen, 71 F. Supp. 788 (M. D. Ga. 1947); aff'd, 164 F.
2d 428 (5th Cir. 1947) (By agreement wife lived in home of husband, under
prescribed conditions, as part of the alimony settlement. The court indicated that
rental value of the house was not taxable to the wife, because such a payment
would not be considered periodic as required by Section 22(k).).
"U. S. Treas. Reg. 111 §29.22(k)-i(a) (1948).
"U. S. Treas. Reg. 111 §29.23(u)-1 (1948).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-147(14) (Supp. 1949).
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deduction for alimony if the payments claimed as a deduction are actually
made within seventy-five days of the close of the taxpayer's fiscal or
calendar year, whichever is used. A deduction claimed by a cash basis
taxpayer for the transfer of property or lump sum payment must be
taken in the income year in which the transfer of property or lump sum
payment is effected. No deduction may later be claimed if not taken
in that year. But if the taxpayer uses the accrual basis for reporting
income the deduction for lump sum payments or transfer of property
may be claimed on the accrual basis and no subsequent deduction shall
be allowed.
HUNTER DALTON HEGGiE.
Taxation-Income-Gain from Sale of Land with
Growing Crops
Cases involving taxation of gain from the sale of land upon which
there are growing crops are recent and in conflict. It seems odd that
the tax consequences of such a sale have not been previously settled with
finality. The basic facts are simple. Taxpayer is a farmer engaged in
growing crops for sale at maturity. He sells land which he has owned
for more than six months upon which there is an immature crop. Tax-
payer reports his gain as a capital one within §117(j) of the Internal
Revenue Code.1
Section 117(j) is a relief provision which allows gain from the sale
of certain business property, not otherwise considered as a capital asset,
to be taxed as a capital gain. To come within this section, the taxpayer
must establish that the property sold was (1) used in his trade or
business; (2) real estate or property subject to an allowance for de-
preciation; (3) held for more than six months; (4) not property
includible in inventory; and (5) not held primarily for sale to custom-
ers in the ordinary course of trade or business.
The Bureau ruled in 19462 that upon the sale of a citrus grove hav-
ing immature fruit on the trees, a portion of the sale price must be
allocated to the growing fruit and the gain therefrom taxed as ordinary
income. The balance, attributable to the land and trees, was ruled to
be a capital gain within §117(j). A majority of the Tax Court has
followed this ruling, holding that upon the sale of either an orange
grove3 or land containing an immature wheat crop,4 an allocation must
be made on the basis of the fair market value of the growing crop at
I See Hill, Ordinary Income or Capital Gain on the Sale of an Orange Grove,
4 MIAmi L. Q. 145 (1950), written prior to the cases commented upon here.
2 1. T. 3815, 1946-2 Cum. BU.L. 30.
3 Earnest A. Watson, 15 T. C. 104 (1950).
'Thomas J. McCoy, 15 T. C. 106 (1950).
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the time of the sale. A federal district court has held to the contrary
that the entire gain from sale of a citrus grove is one within the pur-
view of §117(j). 5
The district court followed §117(j) closely, finding compliance with
each of the statutory requisites.6 The Tax Court, however, held (2)
and (5) listed above were not established. Thus the conflict between
the two courts may be reduced to two issues: (1) Are the growing
crops to be considered part of the real estate? (2) Are such crops held
primarily for sale in the ordinary course of taxpayer's business?
In holding for taxpayer, the district court ruled the unripe fruit on
the trees to be part of taxpayer's realty, since under applicable state
law it was considered as such. The Tax Court, however, held the
status of growing crops under state law immaterial, as the character of
income must be determined solely by reference to the taxing act.
Growing crops are treated variously in the several states as realty
and personalty, depending on the nature of the transaction and character
of the crops.7 The courts tend to treat unsevered annual crops as per-
sonalty, and perennials, such as growing fruit, as part of the realty. It
is well established that the federal tax laws are intended to be uniform
throughout the nation.8 The federal statute should be the criterion;
technical concepts of state property law should not control in this
situation. Such a sale should have the same consequences taxwise in
all states.
The question remains as to the status of the growing crops. The
Internal Revenue Code does not define the term "real estate." Thus
the words of the statute should be interpreted in their ordinary every-
day sense,' 0 keeping in mind the purposes of the statute. In common
parlance, real estate does not mean growing crops. Practically speaking
such crops are a factor apart from the land in determining the sale
price, and should be considered separately for tax purposes. Although
there are differences under state law, whether the growing crop is of
the annual or perennial type should not be of significance taxwise. In
either case, had the crop been harvested, the gain would have been
ordinary income.
'Irrgang v. Fabs, 94 F. Supp. 206 (S. D. Fla. 1950). This case has been
appealed by the Government to the U. S. Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit.
'In Irrgang v. Fahs, supra note 5, the court referred incidentally to the fact
that the immature fruit had its beginning more than six months prior to the date
of sale. This was held immaterial, as the fruit is part of the tree; the holding
period of the trees was said to be controlling.
7 See Note, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1219 (1910) ; 25 C. 3. S. §1; 8 R. C. L. 356.
'See Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U. S. 188, 194 (1938) ; Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S.
103, 110 (1932).9 If it is not so held, a farmer having portions of his farm in two states
obtains a tax saving by selling land with crops thereon in one state rather than
the other, because of differences in local law.
'0See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U. S. 1, 6 (1946).
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The district court reasoned the unripe fruit was not being held by
taxpayer for sale in the ordinary course of his business, as his business
was the selling of mature fruit. To the contrary, the Tax Court held
that, although the fruit was sold prior to maturity along with the land,
the form of the transaction does not change the fact that the fruit was
being held by taxpayer for sale in the ordinary course of his business.
It is difficult to see how it can be reasoned that the crops were not
held primarily for sale in the ordinary course of business. It is true
taxpayer was in the business of selling mature fruit. But are crops any
less "heldr by him primarily for sale because sold prior to maturity?
Common sense and reason would suggest they are not. The mere form
and time of the transaction should not control." The crops are the only
thing taxpayer is holding for sale in the ordinary course of his busi-
ness. Effecting their sale prior to maturity along with the land should
not change the nature of his holding.
One might argue that the words of the statute do not authorize
allocation of the sale price for purposes of taxation. This is literally
true, as the statute speaks in terms of business property as a unit. How-
ever, when the statute was drafted, it is doubtful whether this situation
was contemplated. Keeping in mind the economic realities of the situ-
ation, it seems a reasonable construction of the statute to require allo-
cation. Generally a farmer deducts the costs of raising his crops as
ordinary business expenses. He should not be allowed to convert his
profit into a capital gain by effecting their sale immediately prior to
maturity along with the land.
MASON P. THOMAS, JR.
Torts-Misrepresentation-Requisite of Scienter
Defendant's agent, admittedly acting within the scope of his employ-
ment, falsely represented to plaintiff that the house which plaintiff was
buying from defendant was constructed of brick veneer. Plaintiff re-
lied on this representation and was thereby induced to make the pur-
chase. The house in fact was built of "speed brick," an inferior type
of construction. At the close of plaintiff's evidence the court granted
a nonsuit on the ground that there was no proof of scienter. Held,
new trial granted. ". . . a false representation positively made by one
who ought in the discharge of his duty to have known the truth and
who is consciously and recklessly ignorant whether it be true or false,
may be regarded as fraudulent when made to induce a sale and reason-
ably relied on by the vendee."'
"' Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U. S. 504 (1948).
1 Atfinson v. Charlotte Builders, Inc., 232 N. C. 67, 68, 59 S. E. 2d 1 (1950).
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The long recognized elements of fraud and deceit adopted by the
North Carolina court from a textwriter 2 are: (1) a representation, (2)
untrue in fact, (3) the person making it or the person responsible for
it, knows it to be untrue, or is culpably ignorant (that is, recklessly and
consciously ignorant) whether it be true or not, (4) made with the
intent that it be acted upon, or in a manner fitted to induce action upon
it, (5) plaintiff acts in reliance to his damage.3
As early as 1799, the court recognized that scienter was a necessary
element of fraud and deceit ;4 the defendant must know that he is telling
a falsehood or that he is practicing a concealment. This was modified
somewhat in the case of Hamrick v. Hogg5 where the rule was laid
down that a representation must be false in fact; defendant must be
guilty of a moral falsehood; and the party making the representation
must know or believe it to be false, or what is the same thing, have no
reason to believe it to be true. This modification gelled in Whitehurst
v. Life Ins. Co. of Va.6 into what is modern-day law. It was there said,
".... if a party to a bargain avers the existence of a material fact reck-
lessly, or affirms its existence positively, when he is consciously ignorant
whether it be true or false, he may be held responsible for a falsehood;
and this doctrine is especially applicable when the parties to a bargain
are not upon equal terms with reference to the representation. . .. -7 It
I POLLOcK, TORTS 283 (12th ed. 1923).
'Small v. Dorsett, 223 N. C. 754, 28 S. E. 2d 514 (1943); Ward v. Heath,
222 N. C. 470, 24 S. E. 2d 5 (1943) ; Harding v. Southern Loan & Ins. Co., 218
N. C. 129, 10 S. E. 2d 599 (1940); Whitehurst v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 149 N. C.
273, 62 S. E. 1067 (1908). It is generally considered that the representation must
be of a material fact. The North Carolina court also has held that the repre-
sentation can be a concealment as well as a statement of fact. Isler v. Brown,
196 N. C. 685, 146 S. E. 803 (1929); Cash Register Co. v. Townsend, 137 N. C.
652, 50 S. E. 306 (1905) ; Saunderson v. Ballance, 55 N. C. 322 (1856) ; Brown
v. Gray, 51 N. C. 103 (1858); Gerkins v. Williams, 48 N. C. 11 (1855); Case v.
Edney, 26 N. C. 93 (1843).
"Irwin v. Sherril, 1 N. C. (Taylor) 1 (1799). If bare naked lie the truth
or falsity of which is unknown, no action maintainable; if known falsehood and
loss suffered, action will lie.
12 N. C. 350 (1827).
'Whitehurst v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 149 N. C. 273, 62 S. E. 1067 (1908)
(Agent misrepresented to blind plaintiff that insurance policy provision allowed
plaintiff to collect the total premiums paid plus 4% interest at the end of ten
years.).
"For cases involving this doctrine prior to the Whitehurst case: e.g., Modlin
v. Roanoke R.R. & Nay. Co., 145 N. C. 218, 58 S. E. 1075 (1907) ; Cash Register
Co. v. Townsend, 137 N. C. 652, 50 S. E. 306 (1905); Ramsey v. Wallace, 100
N. C. 75, 6 S. E. 638 (1888); Cobb v. Fogalman, 23 N. C. 440 (1841). Subse-
quent to the Whitehurst case: e.g., Vail v. Vail, 233 N. C. 109, 63 S. E. 2d 202
(1951); Brooks Equipment & Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 230 N. C. 680, 55 S. E. 2d
311 (1949) ; Small v. Dorsett, 223 N. C. 754, 28 S. E. 2d 514 (1943); Harding
v. Southern Loan & Ins. Co., 218 N. C. 129, 10 S. E. 2d 599 (1940); Silver v.
Skidmore, 213 N. C. 231, 195 S. E. 775 (1938) ; Stone v. Doctors' Lake Milling
Co., 192 N. C. 585, 135 S. E. 449 (1926) ; Bell v. Harrison, 179 N. C. 190, 102
S. E. 200 (1920) ; Pate v. Blades, 163 N. C. 267, 79 S. E. 608 (1913) ; Tarault v.
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can be gathered from this that scienter and its equivalent, reckless
disregard of the truth, are not present where there is innocence. The
party making the misrepresentation must be conscious that it is false, or,
what is in the eyes of the court the same thing, he must be conscious that
he knows neither the truth nor falsity of the misrepresentation.
There are several exceptions to this general requirement of scienter
in an action for fraud and deceit. A director of a corporation has the
duty to know the financial condition of his corporation, and where he
misrepresents such condition he will be held liable for fraud and deceit
without a showing of scienter.8 The president of a corporation is
deemed to have knowledge of an inventory made five days prior to the
misrepresentation.0 Scienter was presumed where the seller who made
the misrepresentation was the inventor ;1O the same presumption is made
where the seller was the manufacturer ;"1 and in a strong dictum the
court said that a vendor or lessor may be held guilty of fraud and deceit
by reason of material, untrue representations in respect to his own busi-
ness or property, the truth of which representation the vendor or lessor
is bound and must be presumed to know.' 2 Where a relationship of
trust and confidence exists between parties, the failure to disclose all
material facts, is a breach of the duty owed and constitutes fraud.'8
In most jurisdictions, if fraud is alleged as the basis for rescission
and at trial only innocent misrepresentations are proved, the court will
nevertheless grant the requested relief.14 North Carolina in Ebbs v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co. adopted a different view: in order to obtain
rescission on the ground of fraud, all the essential elements of fraud
must be proved.15 In other words, whether the relief of damages or the
Seip, 158 N. C. 363, 74 S. E. 3 (1912) ; Hodges v. Smith, 158 N. C. 256, 73 S. E.
807 (1912) ; Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Feezer, 152 N. C. 516, 67 S. E. 1004(1910).8 Harper v. Oak Ridge Supply Co., 184 N. C. 204, 144 S. E. 173 (1922);
Houston v. Thornton, 122 N. C. 365, 295 S. E. 827 (1898); Solomon v. Bates,
118 N. C. 311, 24 S. E. 478 (1896); Tate v. Bates, 118 N. C. 287, 24 S. E. 482(1896).9 Palomino Mills, Inc. v. Davidson Mills Corp., 230 N. C. 286, 52 S. E. 2d
915 (1949).
11Unitype Company v. Ashcroft Bros., 155 N. C. 63, 71 S. E. 61 (1911)
(type setting machine).
" Peebles v. Patapsco Guano Co., 77 N. C. 233 (1877) (commercial fertilizer).
"See Corley Co. v. Griggs, 192 N. C. 171, 174, 134 S. E. 406, 407 (1926);
citing Lehigh Zinc & Iron Co. v. Bamford, 150 U. S. 665, 673 (1893).
" Vail v. Vail, 233 N. C. 109, 63 S. E. 2d 202 (1951) (Evidence showed a
72 year-old mother to have been induced by son to sign a deed conveying to him
a tract of land other than one agreed upon. On appeal from non-suit the court
held that the fiduciary relationship, added to this evidence, constituted a prima
facie case of fraud.).
14 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS §1500 (Rev. ed. 1937).
199 N. C. 242, 153 S. E. 858 (1930). There was also some indication in
this case that rescission might be granted on a unilateral mistake relying on a
dictum in Long v. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 178 N. C. 503, 101 S. E. 11 (1919).
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relief of rescission is sought on the ground of fraud, the elements of
fraud which must be proved are identical. This includes of course the
necessity of proving scienter in an action for either relief.
Although the court in the principal case chose to ignore Ebbs v. St.
Louis U-nion Trust Co., the two cases are almost identical on their
facts.16  The Ebbs case was an action for rescission and damages on
the basis of fraud, and the principal case was an action for damages
based on fraud. It is rather evident from the two cases, that the mis-
representations were either made with knowledge of their falsity, or in
conscious ignorance as to their truth or falsity. The one making the
false representation in each case was a real estate agent, who was or
should have been experienced in the fundamentals of house construction.
Since the facts of both cases show only a lack of knowledge of truth or
falsity, with relief being granted in one and denied in the other, the
necessary conclusion follows that the two cases are in substance
inconsistent.
It would seem that the court in the Ebbs case completely overlooked
the long line of decisions in North Carolina which support the holding
of the principal case that actual knowledge of the falsity of a misrepre-
sentation is not necessary to a finding of fraud. On the basis of the
instant case as supported by the chain of decisions, the Ebbs case (which
was never sound law) is no longer the law in North Carolina, in spite




One B died, apparently intestate. His heirs at law and next of kin
recovered all of his personal papers and turned them over to the Clerk
But in Cheek v. Southern R.R., 214 N. C. 152, 156, 198 S. E. 626, 628 (1938)
the court said, "The court has not adopted the doctrine that an unilateral mistake-
or mistake alone of the party seeking to avoid the contract-unaccompanied by
fraud, imposition, undue influence, or like circumstance of oppression, is sufficient
to avoid a contract"' It was indicated in this latter case, however, that it would
be difficult to imagine a case, in which there were innocent misrepresentations on
the one side and a mistake on the other induced by such innocent misrepresenta-
tions, that could not be resolved into mutual mistake. E.g., Vail v. Vail, 233
N. C. 109, 63 S. E. 2d 202 (1951); Breece v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 209
N. C. 527, 184 S. E. 86 (1936); Hinsdale v. W. I. Phillips Co., 199 N. C. 563,
155 S. E. 238 (1930); Bell v. Harrison, 179 N. C. 190, 102 S. E. 200 (1920);
Oltman v. Williams, 167 N. C. 312, 83 S. E. 348 (1914).
" 199 N. C. 242, 153 S. E. 858 (1930) ; Note, 9 N. C. L. REv. 86 (1930) (real
estate broker represented house to be perfectly constructed and made of stone,
when in fact, it was stone veneer; held, representations made without knowledge
of their falsity, and consequently without intent to deceive). This case was cited
in the Brief for Appellees, pp. 4, 11, Atkinson v. Charlotte Builders, Inc., 232
N. C. 67, 59 S. E. 2d 1 (1950).
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of the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County. Included among the
papers was an instrument which in form appeared to be a holographic
will, dividing his property among the relatives of his deceased wife as
well as some of his own kin. The Clerk appointed a collector. No
probate in common form was had.
The heirs at law and next of kin brought an action to remove cloud
on title under N. C. GEN. STAT. §41-10 (1943) which prayed (1) that
the instrument be declared not to be the will of the deceased and (2)
ownership of the property of their kinsman free of any claim of the
defendants, who were the beneficiaries under the unprobated instrument.
The defendants contended the paper writing constituted a valid holo-
graphic will and should be probated as the last will of B. The issues
submitted by the trial court were as follows: (1) Was the said paper
writing found among the valuable papers and effects of the said B after
his death? (2) Is the said paper writing the last will and testament of
B? The trial judge instructed the jury to answer the first issue, No.
On appeal the defendant's demurrer ore tenus for want of jurisdiction
in the Superior Court, was sustained by the Supreme Court which held
that an attack on a will must originate by probate, which is exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the Clerk of the Superior Court, and that a
caveat is the proper proceeding to try the issue of devisavit vel non.1
The plaintiffs, believing they had a valid defense to the instrument,
faced a dilemma as to the procedure they should follow in order to
initiate an action to contest the validity of the will. The statutes pro-
vided a means whereby they could get the instrument into the hands of
the Clerk of the Superior Court but no means to compel anyone to
offer it for probate.2 Since there is no limitation on the period in which
a will may be offered for probate the heirs at law held a title of ques-
tionable value.3
An unprobated will does not pass any title,4 and mere assertions of
an adverse claim standing alone are not sufficient to constitute a cloud.5
1 Brissie v. Craig, 232 N. C. 701, 62 S. E. 2d 330 (1950).
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. §31-5 (1943).
'Cooley v. Lee, 170 N. C. 18, 86 S. E. 720 (1915); Steadman v. Steadman,
143 N. C. 345, 55 S. E. 784 (1906); N. C. Gmr. STAT. §31-12 (1943) pro-
vides in part "... . Such will shall not be valid or effective to pass real estate or
personal property as against innocent purchasers for value and without notice,
unless it is probated or offered for probate within two years after the death of
the testator or devisor ... ." While this might protect subsequent purchasers
from the heirs at law it offers no protection to the heirs at law.
IN. C. GET. STAT. §31-39 (1943) : "No will shall be effectual to pass real or
personal estate unless it shall have been duly proved and allowed in the probate
court of the proper county... ." Paul v. Davenport, 217 N. C. 154, 7 S. E. 2d 352(1940) ; Osborne v. Leak, 89 N. C. 433 (1883).
'Welles v. Rhodes, 59 Conn. 498, 22 AtI. 286 (1890) ; Israel v. Wolf, 100 Ga.
339, 28 S. E. 109 (1897) ; Trustees of Schools v. Wilson, 334 Ill. 347, 166 N. E.
55 (1929); Lovell v. Marshall, 162 Minn. 18, 202 N. W. 64 (1925); Sulphur
Mines Co. v. Boswell, 94 Va. 480, 27 S. E. 24 (1897).
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Cloud on title as it developed in equity is not broad enough to cover the
above situation." The action to remove cloud on title in North Carolina
is statutory 7 and has been given a liberal construction, thereby broadening
this equitable remedy.8 Accordingly a probated will can be construed in
this type of action, the question being what interest or title passes and
not the validity of the will.9 The aim of the principal case, as disclosed
by the prayer for judgment and the issues submitted, was to contest the
validity of the will and since this can only be done by a will contest the
plaintiff's action under this statute was improper.
Similar difficulties would have confronted the plaintiffs had they
tried to proceed under the declaratory judgment act.10 Only the con-
struction of a probated will could be tested in this type of proceeding.11
There could not be an attack on the validity of the will nor could the
construction of an unprobated will be obtained.12 Also, the equitable
relief of injunction is not available to enjoin the probate of a will
where exclusive probate jurisdiction is conferred upon one court.13
By dictum the court pointed out the only relief available to the plain-
"Cloud on title is something which constitutes an apparent incumbrance upon
it or an apparent defect in it; something that shows prima facie some right of
a third party, either to the whole or some interest in it." Detroit v. Martin, 34
Mich. 170 (1876) ; McArthur v. Griffith, 147 N. C. 545, 61 S. E. 519 (1908).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. §41-10 (1943).
' "And it should and does extend to such adverse and wrongful claims, whether
in writing or parol, whenever a claim by parol, if established, could create an
interest or estate in the property .... And it should be allowed, too, when ex-
istent records or written instruments reasonably present such a claim. .. "
Satterwhite v. Gallagher, 173 N. C. 525, 528, 92 S. E. 369, 370 (1917) ; see also,
Platkin v. Merchants Bank, 188 N. C. 711, 125 S. E. 541 (1924) ; Southern State
Bank v. Summer, 187 N. C. 762, 122 S. E. 848 (1924); Carolina-Tennessee
Power Co. v. Hiawassee River Power Co., 175 N. C. 668, 96 S. E. 99 (1918).
'Lewis v. McConchie, 151 Kan. 778, 100 P. 2d 752 (1940); Hahn v. Verret,
143 Neb. 820, 11 N. W. 2d 551 (1943) ; Johnston v. Johnston, 218 N. C. 706, 12
S. E. 2d 248 (1940); Nobles v. Nobles, 177 N. C. 243, 98 S. E. 715 (1919);
Franklin v. Margay Oil Co., 194 Okla. 519, 153 P. 2d 486 (1944).
"0 N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-253 to §1-267 (1943).
11 Smith v. Nelson, 249 Ala. 51, 29 So. 2d 335 (1949); Fillmore v. Yar-
borough, 246 Ala. 375, 20 So. 2d 792 (1945) ; Howard v. Bennett, 53 Cal. App.
2d 546, 127 P. 2d 1012 (1942); Colden v. Costello, 50 Cal. App. 2d 363, 122 P.
2d 959 (1942) ; Lloyd v. Weir, 116 Conn. 201, 164 Atl. 386 (1933) ; Sample v.
Ward, 156 Fla. 210, 23 So. 2d 81 (1945); Weppler v. Hoffine, 218 Ind. 31, 29
N. E. 2d 204 (1940); Sharpe v. Sharpe, 164 Kan. 484, 190 P. 2d 344 (1949);
Brown v. Trustees, 181 Md. 80, 28 A. 2d 582 (1942) ; Bank v. Morey, 320 Mass.
492, 70 N. E. 2d 316 (1946) ; Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Lambeth, 213 N. C.
576, 197 S. E. 179 (1938) ; Roundtree v. Roundtree, 213 N. C. 252, 195 S. E. 784(1938); Anderson v. Anderson, 150 Ore. 476, 46 P. 2d 98 (1935); Chapin v.
Collard, 29 Wash. 2d 788, 189 P. 2d 642 (1948). For example of restrictions
on this point see Note, 26 N. C. L. REv. 69 (1947).2 Pennington v. Green, 152 Kan. 739, 107 P. 2d 766 (1941) ; Poore v. Poore,
201 N. C. 791, 161 S. E. 532 (1931); cf. Roundtree v. Roundtree, 213 N. C. 252,
195 S. E. 784 (1938).
" Furr v. Jordan, 196 Ga. 862, 27 S. E. 2d 861 (1943) ; Ragan v. Bank of
Rome, 177 Ga. 686, 170 S. E. 889 (1933) ; Israel v. Wolf, 100 Ga. 339, 28 S. E.
109 (1897) ; Feamster v. Feamster, 123 W. Va. 353, 15 S. E. 2d 159 (1941).
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tiffs. "He may invoke such remedy by the simple expedient of simul-
taneously applying to the Clerk of the Superior Court having jurisdiction
to have the script probated or proved, i.e., tested, and filing a caveat
asking that it be declared invalid as a testamentary instrument."'14 This
result is made possible by the construction placed upon the phrase "any
person interested in the estate" as found in the statute for probate; and
caveat to a will. 16 Since the heirs at law would take the property had
the owner died intestate, they are recognized as parties interested in the
estate.1 7  While this relationship might justify proceeding under either
one of the statutes, to permit the heirs at law to combine the above stat-
utes and be both proponents and caveators produces an unusual situation.
Indeed one court said, "He is both proponent and defendant. His posi-
tions are incongruous. As a matter of procedure, he cannot be a party of
record on opposite sides of the same proposition."' 8 A proponent, how-
ever, is by definition a party who offers an instrument for legal adjudi-
cation.19 It does not seem that this would require him to be interested in
having the validity sustained no matter how often such interests coincide.
This objection to caveat by a proponent is met also by the fact that a will
contest is a proceeding in rem and not between the parties.20  The sole
issue is whether or not the instrument is a valid will. Accordingly most
of the courts which have passed upon this point have held that no
estoppel operates to prevent a proponent from caveating the will, and
especially is this true where the caveator was under a duty to produce
the will for probate.21
" Brissie v. Craig, 232 N. C. 701, 706, 62 S. E. 2d 330, 334 (1950).
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. §31-13 (1943) : "If no executor apply to have will proved
within sixty days after the death of the testator, any devisee or legatee namedin the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may make such
application. . ..
SN. C. GEN. STAT. §31-32 (1943) "... any person entitled under such will,
or interested in the estate, may ... enter a caveat to the probate of such will ....
17 Hall v. Proctor, 242 Ala. 636, 7 So. 2d 764 (1942) ; In re Stoiber's Estate,
101 Colo. 192, 72 P. 2d 276 (1937) ; In re Kinney's Estate, 233 Iowa 600, 10 N. W.
2d 73 (1943); Hemonas v. Orphan, 191 S. W. 2d 352 (Mo. 1946); In re Mor-
row's Will, 41 N. M. 723, 73 P. 2d 1360 (1937); Bailey v. McLain, 215 N. C.
150, 1 S. E. 2d 372 (1939); Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N. E. 2d 245(1947) ; In re Harjoche's Estate, 193 Okla. 631, 146 P. 2d 130 (1944).
18 Appeal of Thompson, In re Nichol's Estate, 114 Me. 338, 96 Atl. 238 (1915).
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"In re Cassada's Will, 228 N. C. 548, 46 S. E. 2d 468 (1948) ; In re Lomax'
Will, 226 N. C. 498, 39 S. E. 2d 388 (1946); Burney v. Holloway, 225 N. C.633, 36 S. E. 2d 5 (1945); Bailey v. McClain, 215 N. C. 150, 1 S. E. 2d 372(1939) ; In re Brown's Will, 194 N. C. 583, 140 S. E. 192 (1927) ; In re Young,
123 N. C. 358, 31 S. E. 626 (1898) ; Hutson v. Sawyer, 104 N. C. 1, 10 S. E. 85(1889).
"1lit re Biehn's Estate, 41 Ariz. 403, 18 P. 2d 1112 (1933) ; Blatt v. Blatt, 79
Colo. 57, 243 Pac. 1099 (1926) ; Abercrombie v. Hair, 185 Ga. 728, 196 S. E. 447(1938) ; Howard v. Howard, 268 Ky. 552, 105 S. W. 2d 630 (1937) ; Scott v. Daw-




The court's denial of the requested equitable relief because a remedy
existed at law is not objectionable in the principal case as a blind ad-
herance to procedure which postpones adjudication on the merits.
Rather, it is a question of fundamental power to hear and determine
probate matters. The right to dispose of one's property by will is not
an inherent or guaranteed one, but rather one granted by the legisla-
ture.22  Nor is is an unrestricted right. The Clerk of the Superior
Court is given exclusive original jurisdiction in probate .matters under
the statutes.23  The court had no alternative but to dismiss the action
and the suggested course of action, while unusual, represents no more
than a liberal interpretation of the statutes to meet an unanticipated
situation.
KENNETHa R. HOYLE.
Unincorporated Associations-Capacity to Sue and Be Sued
In a recent case' the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that
under N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-97(6) (1943)2 an unincorporated association
could sue or be sued in its common name. Although the statute in
question does not expressly authorize this departure from the common
" Wescott v. Bank, 227 N. C. 39, 40 S. E. 2d 461 (1946) ; Peace v. Edwards,
170 N. C. 64, 86 S. E. 807 (1915) ; Pullen v. Commissioners, 66 N. C. 361 (1872).
"' N. C. GEN. STAT. §2-16 (1943); N. C. GEN. STAT. §28-1 (1943); N. C.
GEN. STAT. §§31-12 to 31-27 (1943).
'Ionic Lodge No. 72 F.A. & A.M. v. Ionic Lodge Free Ancient & Accepted
Masons No. 72 Company, 232 N. C. 252, 59 S. E. 2d 829 (1950).
"Any unincorporated association or organization, whether resident or non-
resident, desiring to do business in this state by performing any of the acts for
which it was formed, shall, before any such acts are performed, appoint an agent
in this state upon whom all processes and precepts may be served, and certify to
the clerk of the superior court of each county in which said association or organ-
ization desires to perform any of the acts for which it was organized the name
and address of such process agent. If said unincorporated association or organi-
zation shall fail to appoint the process agent pursuant to this subsection, all
precepts, and processes may be served upon the secretary of state of the state
of North Carolina. Upon such service, the secretary of state shall forward a
copy of the process or precept to the last known address of such unincorporated
association or organization. Service upon the process agent appointed pursuant
to this subsection or upon the secretary of state, if no process agent is appointed,
shall be legal and binding on said association or organization, and any judgment
recovered in any action commenced by service of process, as provided in this
subsection shall be valid and may be collected out of any real or personal prop-
erty belonging to the association or organization.
"Any such unincorporated association or organization, now performing any of
the acts for which it was formed, shall within thirty days from the ratification of
this subsection, appoint an agent upon whom processes and precepts may be served,
as provided in this subsection, and in the absence of such appointment, such
processes and precepts may be served upon the secretary of state, as provided in
this subsection. Upon such service, the secretary of state shall forward a copy
of the process or precept to the last known address of such unincorporated asso-
ciation or organization."
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law,3 the court felt that when construed with N. C. GEN. STAT. §39-24
(1943) 4 and N. C. GEN. STAT. §39-25 (1943)r this was a sufficient
expression of the legislative intent to change the common law rule.6
However, upon rehearing of the same case the court reversed itself,7
stating that N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-70 (1943)s precluded the former inter-
pretation of N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-97(6) (1943) and that the common
law rule still prevailed except as modified by N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-70
(1943). This decision does not settle the question as to whether N. C.
GEN. STAT. §1-97(6) (1943) authorizes suit against an unincorporated
association in its common name, since the only question before the court
in the present case was whether an unincorporated association could sue.
If it were held that N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-97(6) (1943) authorizes
suit against all unincorporated associations, but that only certain unin-
corporated associations could in turn sue, there might be a question as
to the constitutionality of the statute. This question has not been pre-
sented to the North Carolina court, but in view of the fact that the
substantive rights of these associations are not affected and they still
retain their common law right of action through the members, it would
-'At common law an unincorporated association could not sue or be sued in
the association name on the theory that it was not a legal entity. Tucker v. Eatough,
186 N. C. 505, 120 S. E. 57 (1923), Note, 10 N. C. L. RLv. 313 (1932).
' "Voluntary organizations and associations of individuals organized for chari-
table, fraternal, religious, or patriotic purposes, when organized for the purposes
which are not prohibited by law, are hereby authorized and empowered to acquire
real estate and to hold the same in their common or corporate names: Provided,
that voluntary organizations and associations of individuals, within the meaning
of this article, shall not include associations, partnerships or copartnerships which
are organized to engage in any business, trade or profession."
' "Where real estate has been or may be hereafter conveyed to such orzani-
zations or associations in their common or corporate name the said title shall vest
in said organizations, and may be conveyed by said organization in its common
name, when such conveyance is authorized by resolution of the body duly con-
stituted and held, by a deed signed by its chairman or president, and its secretary
or treasurer, or such officer as is the custodian of its common seal with its official
seal affixed, the said conveyance to be proven and probated in the same manner
as provided by law for deeds by corporations, and conveyance thus made by such
organizations, and associations shall convey good and fee simple title to said
land."
'Ionic Lodge No. 72 F.A. & A.M. v. Ionic Lodge Free Ancient & Accepted
Masons No. 72 Company, 232 N. C. 252, 258, 59 S. E. 2d 829, 833 (1950). The
position the court took was advocated by a recent note, 25 N. C. L. REV. 319
(1947).
'Ionic Lodge No. 72 F.A. & A.M. v. Ionic Lodge Free Ancient & Accepted
Masons No. 72 Company, 232 N. C. 648, 62 S. E. 2d 73 (1950).
s "... Any and/or all unincorporated, beneficial organizations, fraternal benefit
orders, associations and/or societies, or voluntary fraternal beneficial organiza-
tions, orders, associations and/or societies issuing certificates and/or policies of
insurance, foreign or domestic, now or hereafter doing business in this state, shall
have the power to sue and/or be sued in the name commonly known and/or used
by them in the conduct of their business to the same extent as any other legal
entity established by law, and without naming any of the individual members com-
posing it: Provided, however, this section shall apply only in actions concerning
such certificates and/or policies of insurance."
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seem that the states are within their authority in enacting such a
statute.0
The principal case does make it clear that the capacity of unincor-
porated associations to sue and be sued must rest on a specific legis-
lative enactment. Since the final decision in the principal case, the
North Carolina General Assembly has enacted an amendment 0 to N. C.
GEN. STAT. §39-24 (1943) which allows unincorporated associations
holding real estate under that section to sue and be sued in their com-
mon names in actions concerning real estate so held. The effect of this
amendment is to overrule the principal case, but it still leaves the
majority of unincorporated associations without a simple method of
litigating their rights.
The inconvenience, brought about by the application of the common
law doctrine under modem business conditions has led to much legis-
lation, altering more or less, the common law procedure. 1 Some statutes
provide for suits against associations (or partnerships) in the name of
the associations with service of process on the officers or other asso-
ciates. Judgments under such statutes bind the association property,
but the individual property of those members who have not been per-
sonally served is not bound.12 These statutes usually provide for execu-
tion on the association property before proceeding against the individual
property of the members.13 Their validity appears unquestionable. 14
A few states, however, have statutes which though somewhat similar,
provide for judgments binding individually even those members not
personally served. 15 The validity of these statutes is doubtful. Under
the authority of two United States Supreme Court decisions' 6 it would
seem to be a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as to any person not a resident of the forum state; but
" See 160 U. S. 389, 393 (1895) where the court said, "But it is clear that the
Fourteenth Amendment in no way undertakes to control the power of a State to
determine by what process legal rights may be asserted or legal obligation be
enforced, provided the method of procedure adopted for these purposes gives
reasonable notice and affords fair opportunity to be heard before the issues are
decided."
'0 N. C. Sess. Laws 1951 c. 86.
11 The various state acts are classified and discussed in detail in WARREN,
CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INcORPORATION 542 et seq (1929).
TrEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6133-S (1949).
TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6137 (1949): "Every member who is per-
sonally served is individually liable for any amount of judgment not satisfied by
levy on association property,"
Sugg v. Thornton, 132 U. S. 524 (1889) ; Jardine v. Superior Court in and
for Los Angeles County, 213 Cal. 301, 2 P. 2d 756 (1931) ; United States Heater
Co. v. Iron Moulders Union, 129 Mich. 354, 88 N. W. 889 (1902).
' S. C. CODE ANN. §§7790-7798 (1942) ; VT. Pu. LAWS §5720 (1933).
'
0 D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165 (U. S. 1851) ; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S.
714 (1877).
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in a case in which residence of parties was not mentioned, the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that such a judgment was valid.1 7
The several states are not in accord as to whether these enabling
statutes apply to ordinary partnerships. Some of the statutes expressly
exclude their application to common law partnerships,' 8 and other states
have reached the same result by judicial decision.10 Still others treat
a partnership like any other association and allow suits in the common
name.
20
A few of the state statutes have been held not to extend to non-
profit associations. 21 It would seem that the need for allowing suits in
the common name against associations such as labor unions and fraternal
organizations, would be as great, or greater, than the need as to business
organizations. Some states take this view and extend their statutes to
cover any unincorporated association, whether organized for profit or
not.
22
In view of the great need for a simple method of suit by and against
the many unincorporated associations that exist today,2 it is suggested
that the legislature enact a specific statute allowing suits by and against
such associations in their common names. The following statute is
respectfully submitted:
All unincorporated associations or orders, whether organized for
profit or not, may hereafter sue or be sued under the name by
which they are commonly known and called, or under which they
do business, and judgments and executions against any such asso-
ciation or order shall bind its real and personal property in like
manner as if it were incorporated: Provided, however, this sec-
tion shall not apply to ordinary partnerships as defined in G. S.
59-124 and G. S. 59-36.25
J. KNOX WALKER.
17Ex parte Baylor, 93 S. C. 414, 77 S. E. 59 (1913). Professor Warren in his
treatise, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION at p. 554 expresses the
opinion that the decision in Ex parte Baylor would not have been sustained by the
Supreme Court of the United States if the case had been carried to that Court.18 DEL. Rzv. CODE §4676 (1935).
"
9Texas Land & Cattle Co. v. Molina, 258 S. W. 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
'0 CAL. C1v. CODE §388 (1941), Craig v. San Fernando Furn. Co., 89 Cal. App.
167, 264 Pac. 784 (1928) (applies to partnerships).2 Realty Trust Co. v. First Baptist Church of Haskell, 46 S. W. 2d 1009
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
" Deeney v. Hotel and Apartment Clerks' Union, 57 Cal. App. 2d 1023, 134
P. 2d 328 (1943); Herald v. Glendale Lodge, 46 Cal. App. 325, 189 Pac. 329
(1920).23 And to avoid further piecemeal legislation exemplified by the latest North
Carolina statute on the problem. See note 10 supra.2 4 UNiFoRm LImn PARTNERsHip AcT §1.
'
2 UNIFORm PARTNERSHIP ACT §6.
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